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ABSTRACT
This dissertation is divided into three chapters. In the first chapter, I study the effects
of texting and handheld cell phone bans on the traffic crash fatalities in the United States.
In the second chapter, I analyze the impact of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act on the Value-at-Risk
of the companies with publicly traded stocks. The last chapter is devoted to analyze the
relationship between economic growth and economic inequality in Brazil. Below are the
individual abstracts for each chapter.
Chapter 1: Are Handheld Cell Phone and Texting Bans Really Effective in Reducing
Fatalities?
This chapter aims at evaluating if texting and handheld cell phone bans are effective
in reducing the number of fatalities occurring in motor vehicle crashes using US county-
level data. In the past two decades many debates have been going on among policy makers
regarding the impact of using mobile phone devices while driving. This political debate
is partially motivated by the lack of clear empirical evidence on the relationship between
cell phone use, bans and driving performance. Our results show that States that enacted
primary cell phone bans experienced a significant reduction in the number of fatalities.
Primary texting bans also affected fatalities, but this effect was significantly smaller than
that estimated for handheld cell phone bans. This is an important and contradicting result,
given most of the legislative activity in 2012 focused on text messaging behind the wheel,
considered the most dangerous of the distracted driving activities. Additionally, we looked
at how heterogeneous were these effects among states that enacted such bans. We observed
that all states benefited from the ban in terms of fatality reduction, however, some were
highly affected (such as CA and DC) and some affected in small scale (such as UT and WA).
ii
Chapter 2: Effects of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act on the Value-at-Risk of the Companies
Registered in the NYSE, Nasdaq and Amex.
This chapter aims at investigating the impact of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) on the
Value-at-Risk (VaR) of the companies that trade their bonds in the New York Stock Ex-
change (NYSE), Nasdaq and American Stock Exchange (Amex). We implemented a Re-
gression Discontinuity Design approach given the cutoff point of US$75 million. Companies
above the cutoff with annual reports for fiscal years ending on or after November 15, 2004
were required to comply with SOX. Our results did not find any significant impact of the
SOX on the VaR for the levels of 1%, 5% and 10%. The benefits of the SOX such as giving
more transparency to the companies are perfectly offset by the higher cost faced by the
companies subject to the Section 404.
Chapter 3: Is There a Kuznets Curve for Brazil? An Investigation Using Bayesian Model
Averaging and Nonparametric Model Selection.
Brazil has become one of the major emerging countries in the world, registering a promis-
ing development scenario. However, the income inequality in Brazil remains higher if com-
pared to countries with similar level of development. Researchers have put much effort
in understanding the relationship between economic growth and economic inequality by
estimating the Kuznets curve using different econometric models, functional forms and es-
timation strategies, but the results are still controversial. Since there is uncertainty about
the economic model and variables used to understand this question, this chapter aims at
estimating the Kuznets curve for Brazilian municipalities by using Bayesian Model Averag-
ing and nonparametric model selection, and identifying the key determinants of economic
inequality. Our results have shown lack of evidence for the existence of the Kuznets hypoth-
iii
esis, although the relationship between income inequality and economic growth is nonlinear.
Variables related to education and provision of basic services seem to have large impact in
reducing income inequality, while current expenditure and State tax transfer seem to be
irrelevant.
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Chapter 1
Are Handheld Cell Phone and
Texting Bans Really Effective in
Reducing Fatalities?
1.1 Introduction
In the past years, the number of cell phone subscribers increased significantly worldwide.
In some countries, such as Russia, Germany, Italy, and Brazil, the number of cell phone
devices even exceeded their population. This situation is not different in the United States,
where the number of mobile phone subscribers was 340,213 in 1985, surpassing 5 million in
1990, and reaching more than 322 million in June of 2011 (CTIA - The Wireless Association,
2011). Doubtless, cell phones have had a substantial impact on users’ lives by allowing them
to make calls, text, or even search for information in the Internet. Nonetheless, these devices
when used in certain circumstances such as driving a motor vehicle may represent a risk,
mainly for the public health, by contributing to increase the number of car crashes and
fatalities.
In the past two decades many debates have been going on among policy makers regarding
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the impact of using mobile phone devices while driving. Opponents of banning cell phone use
argue that no conclusive evidence was ever provided to support such an important imposition.
On the other hand, proponents of the prohibition argue that using a cell phone device while
driving, regardless whether a hands-free device is used or not, can substantially increase
the probability of being involved in a motor vehicle accident. They even compare such
negative effect to the consequences of driving under influence (Redelmeier and Tibshirani,
1997; Laberge-Nadeau et al., 2003; McEvoy et al., 2005). This is the reason why many bills
have been proposed both in the House and in the Senate in all US states, but relatively few
of them have been successfully approved and put in effect.
This political debate is partially motivated by the lack of clear empirical evidence on
the relationship between cell phone use, bans and driving performance. Redelmeier and
Tibshirani (1997), for example, analyzed drivers involved in property damage only accidents
in the Toronto (Canada) area and found that the risk of being involved in an accident was
four times higher when a cell phone was being used. Similar results were found by Laberge-
Nadeau et al. (2003), and by McEvoy et al. (2005), using data for Australian drivers. A
couple of other papers found the opposite. For example, the recent paper by Bhargava and
Pathania (2010), who exploited a price discontinuity in cell phone calls to identify the causal
effect of cell phone use on accidents, found no clear evidence that an increase in cell phone
use contributed to increase the number of motor vehicle accidents.
Along the same lines, some studies found weak or no sufficient evidence that bans are
effective in reducing cell phone use and, as a consequence, the probability of being involved
in an accident. McCartt and Geary (2004), for example, collected data on cell phone use for
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the states of New York and Connecticut one month before, shortly after, and 16 months after
the imposition of a cell phone ban in the state of New York. They found that overall cell
phone use in New York declined from 2.3% prelaw to 1.1% shortly after the ban, while these
rates remained unchanged in Connecticut. Thus, it appears that the ban had a positive effect
in the short-run. However, they found no evidence of a positive effect one year after the ban
was imposed, that is, cell phone use in New York was 2.1% higher than the value calculated
right after the imposition of the ban and this number was not significantly different from
pre-law values. Similar conclusions were drawn by Burger, Kaffine, and Yu (2010), by using
high frequency data and a regression discontinuity design to identify the effect of California’s
ban on hand-held cell phone use on the number of accidents. They found no evidence that
the ban led to a reduction in traffic accidents.
Contrary to these findings, Nikolaev, Robbins, and Jacobson (2010) found that that
there was a significant decrease in both fatal and personal injury accident rate when New
York enacted a law banning hand-held cell phone use. This is a result also present in
Sampaio (2010), who used the state of Pennsylvania as a counterfactual for the state of New
York in a differences-in-differences strategy, and in Sampaio (2012), who used the synthetic
control method (Abadie and Gardeazabal, 2003; Abadie, Diamond, and Hainmueller, 2010)
to construct an adequate counterfactual for the state of New York based on a combination
of many states optimally selected to compose the control group. His findings imply that
the ban caused fatality rates to decrease by almost 9%, on average, and that this effect,
contrary to what has been previously argued, did not dissipate at least in the following 5
years. Finally, Sperber, Shiell, and Fyie (2010), assessing the cost-effectiveness of a law
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banning the use of cellular phones by drivers in the Canadian province of Alberta, concluded
that a ban promotes health and releases resources worth more than the costs.
The potential benefits of banning cell phone use are evident - avoid property damage
and, specially, preserve life on roads. The costs involve advertisement campaign to alert
individuals about new requirements, costs related to the enforcement of the ban for police
officers and court members, and “lost consumer surplus” (Hahn, Tetlock, and Burnett, 2000;
Sperber, Shiell, and Fyie, 2010). Moreover, drivers tend to not comply with the prohibition
after a long period in which becomes necessary to invest in educational campaigns (McCartt
and Geary, 2004). Hence, to provide a solid answer to the cost-benefit analysis of cell
phone bans, one needs solid numbers to each of the cost and benefit parameters considered.
With this in mind, and given that the current literature lacks to provide a concrete answer,
this paper proposes to evaluate if cell phones or texting bans really decreases the chances
of being involved in a motor vehicle accident and the number of fatalities. According to
our knowledge, our paper is the first to look at the effect of cell phone bans countrywide
(basically all American states’ law changes). Previous research has mainly focused on law
changes occurring in particular states. Also, our paper differ from previous literature in
that we not only look at primary handheld bans, but look also at the effect of primary and
secondary handheld and texting bans.
Our results show that imposing a ban on cell phones led to a reduction in the num-
ber of fatalities occurring in motor vehicle crashes. Consistently with what was expected,
states that adopted primary bans experienced a significant reduction on fatalities. Looking
at secondary enforcement ban, we find, as expected, a significantly lower coefficient (about
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one-hundredth of that estimated for primary enforcement) and not statistically different
from zero. With respect to texting bans, our results show indeed that primary texting bans
impacted negatively and significantly the number of fatalities, however, this impact is three
times smaller than the effect estimated for handheld bans. This is a very important and
contradicting result, given most of the legislative activity in 2012 focused on text messag-
ing behind the wheel, considered the most dangerous of the distracted driving activities.
Again, we observed no statistical relationship among secondary texting ban and fatalities.
Additionally, we looked at how heterogeneous was these effects among states that enacted
such bans. We observed that all states benefited from the ban in terms of fatality reduction,
however, some were highly affected (such as CA and DC) and some affected in small scale
(such as UT and WA).
Comparing our results to other transportation and safety policies enacted in the US in
the last decade, we observe that our quantitative results are similar to the effect estimated
for mandatory seat belt laws, for example. Cohen and Graham (2003), who investigated the
effectiveness of mandatory seat belt laws in reducing traffic fatalities using a unique data
set on US state-level seat belt usage, concluded that a 1-percentage-point increase in seat
belt usage would save 136 lives or, in another perspective, moving from the 68% national
usage level (in 2003) to the 90% target level would save annually about 1500-3000 lives (4%
to 8% of all traffic fatalities). Our estimates imply similar percentage changes since States
that enacted handheld cell phone bans experienced almost 10% decrease in the number of
fatalities or, in other words, 670 lives would be saved annually due to the enactment of these
handheld bans. Texting bans where less effective, however, results show that these would
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cause a reduction of about 3% in fatalities.
A major methodological concern, that could compromise our claim that we estimate the
causal link between the ban and fatalities, is that the choice to adopt a ban might not be
orthogonal to unobservable factors that also affect fatalities. We addressed this concern by
looking at the determinants of ban adoption, paying specific attention to the relationship
between time-varying county characteristics, that could be correlated with fatalities, and
the probability of ban adoption. Following Galiani, Gertler, and Schargrodsky (2005), we
estimated a discrete time hazard model and concluded that neither of the socioeconomic
time-varying shocks nor shocks to mortality rates were statistically significant. Hence, the
probability of ban adoption in a given county and period of time does not depend on shocks
to socioeconomic variables that may also affect the fatality rate nor shocks on fatality rate
themselves, which is a strong indication that our identification strategy correctly identifies
the parameter of interest.
After this introduction, the article is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the data
used. In section 3 we discuss the decision do adopt a ban and in section 4 we describe in
detail the methodology used to identify the causal effect of the ban on fatalities. In section
5 we present the results. Finally, section 6 discusses the main implications of the analysis
and present a few concluding remarks.
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1.2 Data
The data regarding motor vehicle fatal accidents were obtained from the Fatality Analysis
Reporting System (FARS) of the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA)
from 1991 to 2009 (Fatality Analysis Reporting System (FARS), 2011). The dataset has a
monthly periodicity for individual casualties and fatal motor vehicle crashes at county level
in the United States.
According to the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA), 06 states
(California, Connecticut, New Jersey, New York, Utah, and Washington) and District of
Columbia have enacted ban on hand-held cell phone while driving until December 2009.
Texting is banned from 15 states (Alaska, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Louisiana, Min-
nesota, Mississippi, New Jersey, New York, North Carolina, Rhode Island, Tennessee, Utah,
Virginia, and Washington) and District of Columbia. There are also restrictions for cell
phone usage for school bus drivers in 16 states1 and District of Columbia, and for novice
drivers in 21 states2 and District of Columbia.
We are excluding 18 states (Alabama, Arizona, Delaware, Florida, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois,
Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Montana, New Mexico, North Dakota, Ohio, Pennsyl-
vania, South Carolina, Texas, and Wisconsin) from our analysis since local jurisdictions
have enacted bans regarding cell phone use while driving. Other states (Florida,3 Kentucky,
1Arkansas, California, Connecticut, Georgia, Kentucky, Louisiana, Minnesota, New Jersey, New York,
North Carolina, Rhode Island, Tennessee, Utah, Virginia, Washington, and West Virginia.
2Arkansas, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Indiana, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, Minnesota, Mis-
souri, Nebraska, New Jersey, New York, North Carolina, Oregon, Rhode Island, Tennessee, Utah, Virginia,
Washington, and West Virginia.
3We excluded Florida because some localities imposed bans on cell phone use before being prohibited
from legislating.
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Louisiana, Mississippi, Nevada, Oklahoma, Oregon, and Utah) prohibit localities from leg-
islating.
Table 1.1 presents information about enactment of handheld and texting cell phone bans
at state level. The state of New York was the first in enacting law that prohibits handheld cell
phone use while driving on November of 2001, followed, in chronological order, by District
of Columbia and New Jersey, Connecticut, Utah, California and Washington. New Jersey
initially enacted a secondary enforcement4 law on July 2004, and then changed to primary
enforcement5 on November 2007. Utah and Washington have enacted only secondary bans.
With respect to the texting ban law, District of Columbia was the first in enacting such
ban, in the same period as handheld cell phone ban. Other states have enacted texting
ban in different periods. Moreover, 25% of the states - Louisiana, New York, Virginia, and
Washington - among those with texting ban opted for a secondary enforcement law.
In our sample, the county of Los Angeles, CA, leads in number of fatalities in motor
vehicle crashes from 1991 to 2009 with 15,209 casualties, followed by San Bernardino, CA
(6,510 casualties), in second, and by San Diego, CA (5,376 casualties), in third. Los Angeles
is the only county with at least 53 fatalities in a given month, and in seven months, during
the 1990s, it suffered at least 100 fatalities per month - with the maximum of 112 casualties
from 106 motor vehicle accidents in November of 1995. At state level, California leads with
75,415 casualties, followed by New York with 29,481 casualties, in second, and by Georgia
with 28,995, in third. On the other hand, the less violent counties on the road are Aleutians
4For secondary enforcement, a law will be enforced if only a primary enforcement offense has occurred,
for instance, the driver is not wearing a seat belt.
5For primary enforcement, another primary enforcement reason is not required for a police officer to stop
drivers.
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East Borough, AK, Hoonah-Angoon, AK, Skagway Borough, AK, Covington, VA, Lexington,
VA, and Manassas Park, VA with no fatalities in the entire sample. Moreover, 60.74% of
the sample has zero fatalities per month-county, and 81.44% have at most one fatality per
month-county. At state level, District of Columbia reported zero fatalities in motor vehicle
crashes in six months, while Arkansas and Vermont reported zero casualties in two and one
month, respectively. Table 1.2 presents average of the variables for the group of states that
have enacted ban on handheld cell phone and those without such ban. States with ban have
slightly lower fatalities and higher fatal accidents. The average values are close between the
groups, except for population.
With respect to control variables, unemployment rate was obtained from the Bureau
of Labor Statistics (BLS), and per capita income and population were obtained from the
Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA)6 (Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2011; Bureau of Economic
Analysis, 2011). We expect that states with higher population and unemployment rate have
higher fatalities, and states with higher per capita income have lower fatalities.
1.3 Adoption of Cell Phone Bans
In the next section we propose to use variability in states/counties cell phone ban adoption
to identify the causal effect of these bans on fatalities. As is well known, our identification
heavily relies on the assumption that the choice of ban adoption is uncorrelated with other
unobserved factors that also affect fatalities (Imbens and Wooldridge, 2009). In our identi-
6These data are available on annual periodicity. We implemented an interpolation to obtain monthly
data.
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fication strategy, we will control non-parametrically for county time-invariant unobservable
characteristics and for monthly differences between accidents rate, however, ban adoption
could also be correlated with other time-varying county characteristics that are also cor-
related with fatalities, which would compromise our parameter identification. We follow
Galiani, Gertler, and Schargrodsky (2005) and estimate a discrete time hazard model to
investigate if the decision to adopt a ban across counties and time depends only on fixed
characteristics, or whether it depends on shocks to socioeconomic variables that may also
affect the mortality rates.
For that, consider that all i = 1, ..., N counties have no bans enacted at t = 0. Our
objective is to estimate a discrete time hazard model of the probability of adopting a ban in
period t = 1, ..., T (Cox, 1972). Let {Ti} be the date of adoption and {Ci} be an indicator
if the observation i is censored. We observe {Yi, δi} where
Yi = min{Ti, Ci} (1.1)
δi = I(Ti < Ci) (1.2)
and we also observe a vector of covariates corresponding to county i at period t, xit. The
hazard function is given by
λ(t | x) = f(t | x)
1− F (t | x) (1.3)
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which is assumed to be
λ(t|x) = exβλ0(t) (1.4)
We can express the conditional hazard function in terms of the integrated baseline hazard
Λ(t) =
∫ t
0
λ0(u)∂u as
log(−log(S(t|x))) = log(Λ(t))− x′β (1.5)
and thus we can write the model as
log(Λ(t)) = x′β + ε (1.6)
with εi iid with extreme value distribution F (ε) = 1− e−eε . The underlying continuous
durations are only observed in disjoint time intervals of unit length. Hence, assume that any
time-dependent covariates only vary between duration intervals but not within them (i.e.
they follow a piece-wise constant path over time). Then, the probability of adopting a ban
in any period for county i is
11
Pr(T ∈ [t− 1, t)) = S(t− 1, xit)− S(t, xit) (1.7)
and the survivor function at the start of period t− 1 is given by
Pr(T > t− 1) = S(t− 1, xit) (1.8)
The parameters β are estimated from the data by the method of maximum likelihood.
The descriptive statistics for the variables used in this analysis are reported in the first
column of table 1.3. The time-invariant covariates include the mean fatality, mean popula-
tion, mean per capita income and mean unemployment rate during the period of analysis,
and a set of county characteristics (per capita income, population and unemployment rate)
from 1991 Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) and 1991 Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA).
The time-varying variables are three, six and nine-month lagged shocks to the observable
socioeconomic variables (per capita income, population and unemployment rate) and to the
fatality rates. As in Galiani, Gertler, and Schargrodsky (2005), we use lagged shocks for two
reasons: (a) the decision to adopt a ban might itself have affected the time-varying variables
(per capita income, population, unemployment rate and fatality rate); (b) the long time
span required for the adoption of a ban, such as the one studied in this paper, suggests that
adoption could not have been a response to contemporaneous shocks.
12
According to columns 2 and 3, which provides similar qualitative conclusions, the fixed
baseline county characteristics that are significant are per capita income and unemployment
rate, hence, they partially explain ban adoption. The important result, however, is that
neither of the socioeconomic time-varying shocks nor the shocks to mortality rates are sta-
tistically significant. Hence, our conclusion is that the probability of ban adoption in a given
county and period of time does not depend on shocks to socioeconomic variables that may
also affect the fatality rate nor shocks on fatality rate themselves. This is a strong indication
that our identification strategy will correctly identify the parameter of interest.
1.4 Methodology
To estimate the causal effect of cell phone bans on the outcomes of interest, we adopt a
county-level fixed-effects model that calculates the difference between the outcomes before
and after the intervention. More specifically, we estimate the following regression model:
Ycms = β0 + β1LAWcms + ΘXcms + λc + λm + cms (1.9)
where Ycms is the outcome of interest for county c, in month-year m and state s. LAWcms
is an indicator that takes the value equal to 1 if county c had a ban imposed in month-year
m, and 0 otherwise. Xcms is a vector of controls such as unemployment rate and per capita
income, and λc and λm are, respectively, county and month-year fixed effects. Finally, cms
is an error term which will be clustered at the state level in all estimations to account
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for heteroskedasticity and serial correlation in unobservable characteristics among counties
belonging to the same state.
The county fixed effects included in the model control non-parametrically for time-
invariant unobservable characteristics while the time fixed effects control non-parametrically
for monthly differences between accidents rate. If accidents are more likely to occur in low
temperature months, for example, then time fixed effects will account for these differences
when estimating the effect of the ban. The vector of county characteristics, Xcms, controls for
time-varying characteristics that might be correlated with the imposition of the ban. Thus,
we interpret the parameter of interest, β1, as the causal effect of imposing a cell phone ban
on the counties treated, i.e., this coefficient represents the average of the outcome of interest
after the imposition of the ban minus the average of this outcome before the enactment of
the ban.
As a robustness check, we also estimate a variant of the model presented in equation
(1.9) in which we add state-specific linear trends (Besley and Burgess, 2004), i.e,
Ycms = β0 + β1LAWcms + ΘXcms + λc0 + λc1 ∗ t+ λm + cms (1.10)
where λc1 is a state-specific trend multiplying the time-trend variable, t. This specifica-
tion is important because it controls for any linear trend that might have happened in the
outcome variable during the period analyzed. This specification also allows the trends to
vary across states. Hence, any other variable at the state level that was evolving linearly
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throughout the period will be taken into account, separating it from the effect of interest.
Finally, we estimate a model which allows the effect of the ban to vary across states that
enacted the law. For that, we estimate the following model:
Ycms = β0 +
∑
i
β1jLAWcmi ∗ Stateim + ΘXcms + λc + λm + cms (1.11)
where Stateim is a dummy variable that equals 1 if State i enacted a ban in month m of
year y. The vector of coefficients β1 represent the ban effect estimated for each state that
ever enacted a law banning the use of handheld cell phone during the period considered in
the analysis.
1.5 Results
In this section, we report the empirical findings for the handheld cell phone and texting
ban analyses. We start by presenting in Table 1.4 estimates of the effect of handheld cell
phone bans on individual fatalities. Columns 1 and 2 evaluate the effect of the primary
and secondary enforcement laws alone, respectively. Note that these specifications include
controls for per capita income, population, unemployment rate, and time and county fixed
effects. Also, standard errors are clustered by counties. As can be observed, primary en-
forcement ban is negatively and significantly related to fatalities. Looking at secondary en-
forcement ban, we find, as expected, a significantly lower coefficient. In fact, the coefficient
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is about one-hundredth of that estimated for primary enforcement and its not statistically
different from zero.
From column 3 on, we add both primary and secondary enforcement law dummies in the
equations. The estimated coefficients reinforces previous results and suggest that imposing
primary handheld cell phone restrictions lead to significant reductions on the number of
fatalities on the road. Note that estimates presented in column 3, which controls only for
time and county fixed effects, are quantitatively the same as estimates controlling for time-
varying covariates (presented in column 4). This is a good indication that other time-varying
factors not controlled for in our estimation seem not to be an issue in this case. If, however,
we had observed large distortions in the two estimates, then one could argue that parameter
values would not only be the causal effect of imposing a cell phone ban on the counties
treated, but the result of other uncontrolled time-varying covariate.
In columns 5 and 6, we add, respectively, controls for the existence of regulations on
school bus and novice driver bans - we use an indicator variable which is 1 when there is a
cell phone restriction regardless if it is handheld, hands-free or texting, and 0 otherwise -, and
texting bans. The estimated coefficient for the parameter of interest remain unchanged with
the inclusion of these additional controls. As mentioned earlier, 81.44% of the sample has
at most one fatality per month-county, therefore, the results obtained here clearly indicate
that there are important gains in preventing casualties from enacting cell phone bans. This
is confirmed by the results presented in column 7 of this table, in which we define Ycms as
log(number of individual fatalities + 1) to provide an easy way to interpret the effects of the
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policy in percentage terms. We obtain that enacting a primary handheld cell phone ban led
to almost 10% decrease in the number of fatalities.
Table 1.5 presents similar specifications, but considering as the dependent variable the
number of fatal accidents, instead of fatalities. Although highly correlated, it is important
to understand how cell phone bans affect not only fatalities but also if it also reduces the
probability of being involved in a fatal accident. The estimated coefficients are smaller
in magnitude when compared to the ones presented in 1.4, however, still large and highly
significant, except for ban with secondary enforcement. Again, primary enforcement bans
have a larger impact on number of fatal accidents when compared to secondary enforcement
bans - these are quite small and not statistically different from zero.
In Table 1.6 we present results of estimates of the effect of texting bans on individual
fatalities and on the number of fatal accidents. The effect of primary and secondary enforce-
ment laws alone are represented in columns 1 and 2, respectively. The primary enforcement
law appears to significantly affects both outcomes (number of fatalities and number of fatal
accidents), while secondary enforcement laws are not statistically related to neither of the
outcomes. Similarly to the handheld ban case, the estimated coefficient for primary enforce-
ment ban is much larger then the coefficient for secondary enforcement (about seven times
higher).
In columns 3-6, we add additional controls to the equation of interest. Again, we should
emphasize that estimates controlling only for time and county fixed effects are quantita-
tively the same as estimates adding time-varying covariates (presented in column 4). This
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highlights that other unobserved time-varying covariates are a small issue and seem to
cause no trouble for our identification strategy. As expected, the estimated coefficient de-
creases slightly once we move from columns 4-6, specially with the inclusion of additional
ban controls. Finally, in column 7 we estimate the model using as dependent variable
log(number of individual fatalities + 1) (in panel A) or log(number of fatal accidents + 1)
(in panel B) to obtain the effects of the policy in percentage terms. We obtain that both
primary and secondary texting bans affected significantly the number of personal fatalities
and the number of fatal accidents. Interestingly, both coefficients have similar impacts on
the dependent variables, i.e., both reduce fatalities by about 3%.
It is worth mentioning that the effect of texting bans on the outcomes of interest is three
times smaller than the effect of handheld bans. This is a very important and contradicting
result, given most of the legislative activity in 2012 focused on text messaging behind the
wheel, considered the most dangerous of the distracted driving activities. To have and idea,
ten states had adopted handheld cell phone bans by june 2012, while this number reached
39 for texting bans in the same date.
Table 1.7 presents a robustness check in which we add region-specific and state-specific
time trends, respectively. These specifications controls for any linear trend that might have
happened in the dependent variable during the period under analysis and allows treated and
controls units to have different trends (Angrist and Pischke, 2009). Regions are defines as
Northeast, Southeast, Midwest, Southwest, and the West. The estimated coefficients for
the handheld and texting bans are smaller than those presented in tables 1.4, 1.5 and 1.6,
respectively, when considering region- or state-specific time trends. Despite this reduction
18
in absolute value, the coefficients imply a statistically significant decline in the average of
individual fatalities for both handheld and texting bans.
Finally, we investigate how heterogeneous was the effect of cell phone bans among the
states that enacted the handheld ban, as stated in equation (1.11). Results, presented in
Table 1.8, show that all states benefited from the ban in terms of fatality reduction. The
effect is more pronounced, however, in District of Columbia and in California, which have
enacted handheld bans with primary enforcement. Utah and Washington, both under bans
with secondary enforcement, had the smallest effect of the ban on fatalities - Utah even shows
a statistically insignificant effect. This result also emphasizes the importance of enacting a
ban in which using a handheld device is sufficient to commit a driving offense.
1.6 Implications and Concluding Remarks
This paper aimed to assess the impact of the cell phone and texting bans on the fatalities
involving motor vehicle accidents. The cell phone bans acts were enacted by American states
at different moments in time. We adopted a county-level fixed-effects model that calculated
the difference between the outcomes before and after the intervention, controlling for a few
time-varying characteristics and, as a robustness check, state-specific linear trends.
A major methodological concern that could compromise our claim that we estimate the
causal link between the ban and fatalities, is that the choice to adopt a ban might not be
orthogonal to unobservable factors that also affect fatalities. We looked at the determinants
of ban adoption, paying specific attention to the relationship between time-varying county
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characteristics, that could be correlated with fatalities, and the probability of ban adoption.
We find that neither of the socioeconomic time-varying shocks nor shocks to mortality rates
were statistically determining adoption. Hence, the probability of ban adoption in a given
county and period of time does not seem to depend on shocks to socioeconomic variables
that may also affect the fatality rate nor shocks on fatality rate themselves, which is a strong
indication that our identification strategy correctly identifies the parameter of interest.
Our results show that imposing a ban on cell phones led to a reduction in the number
of fatalities occurring in motor vehicle crashes. Consistently with what was expected, states
that adopted primary bans experienced a significant reduction on fatalities, while those
who adopted secondary enforcement bans did not. There is a good indication that this
result would still hold if other unobserved time-varying covariates were considered in the
estimation. Looking at texting bans, we show that primary texting bans impacted negatively
and significantly the number of fatalities, however, this impact is three times smaller than
the effect estimated for handheld bans. This is a very important and contradicting result,
given most of the legislative activity in 2012 focused on text messaging behind the wheel,
considered the most dangerous of the distracted driving activities. Finally, we looked at
how heterogeneous was these effects among states that enacted such bans and found that
basically all states benefited from the ban in terms of fatality reduction, however, some were
highly affected (such as CA and DC) and some affected in small scale (such as UT and WA).
Our paper contributes to the current debate regarding the effectiveness of cell phone and
texting bans. The implications of our study range from policy making to assisting cost-
benefit analysis of bans that are currently under discussion in Government agencies. The
20
results emphasize the importance of enacting a ban in which using a cell-phone device -
regardless if it is used for texting or talking - is sufficient to commit a driving offense.
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1.7 Tables
Table 1.1: Handheld and Texting Laws - Enactment by State as of December 2009
State Handheld Ban Texting Ban
Alaska (AK) No September 2008 (P)
Arkansas (AR) No February 2009 (P)
California (CA) July 2008 (P) January 2009 (P)
Colorado (CO) No December 2009 (P)
Connecticut (CT) October 2005 (P) No
District of Columbia (DC) July 2004 (P) July 2004 (P)
Georgia (GA) No No
Indiana (IN) No No
Iowa (IA) No No
Kansas (KS) No No
Kentucky (KY) No No
Louisiana (LA) No July 2008 (S)
Maine (ME) No No
Minnesota (MN) No August 2008 (P)
Mississippi (MS) No July 2009 (P)
Missouri (MO) No No
Nebraska (NE) No No
Nevada (NV) No No
New Hampshire (NH) No No
New Jersey (NJ) July 2004 (S), November 2007 (P) March 2008 (P)
New York (NY) November 2001 (P) November 2009 (S)
North Carolina (NC) No December 2009 (P)
Oklahoma (OK) No No
Oregon (OR) No No
Rhode Island (RI) No November 2009 (P)
South Dakota (SD) No No
Tennessee (TN) No July 2009 (P)
Utah (UT) January 2007 (S) July 2009 (P)
Vermont (VT) No No
Virginia (VA) No July 2009 (S)
Washington (WA) July 2008 (S) January 2008 (S)
West Virginia (WV) No No
Wyoming (WY) No No
Source: Insurance Institute for Highway Safety (IIHS), Distraction.gov (U.S. Department of
Transportation), DrivingLaws.org, and http://mobilephonelaws.com.
Note: The states of Alabama, Arizona, Delaware, Florida, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Maryland,
Massachusetts, Michigan, Montana, New Mexico, North Dakota, Ohio, Pennsylvania, South
Carolina, Texas, and Wisconsin were excluded since local jurisdictions have enacted bans re-
garding cell phone use while driving.
(S) Secondary Enforcement, (P) Primary Enforcement.
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Table 1.2: Summary Statistics
Variable CA, CT, DC, NJ, All Other States
NY, UT, WA
Per Capita Fatalitiesa 1.8240 2.3743
Per Capita Fatal Accidentsa 1.0174 0.9284
Per Capita Income (in $1,000) 27.2170 23.0740
Population (in 100,000) 3.3451 0.4848
Unemployment Rate 6.88 5.68
Note: a: in 100,000 inhabitants.
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Table 1.3: Duration Model of the Probability of Prohibiting Handheld Devices
Variable Mean Coefficients
(Standard Deviation)
(1) (2) (3)
∆Fatalitiest−3 0.0002 0.0133
(1.5493) (0.01)
∆Fatalitiest−6 0.0004 0.0088
(1.5501) (0.01)
∆Fatalitiest−9 0.0002 -0.0092
(1.5513) (0.01)
∆PerCapitaIncomet−3 0.0805 -0.1963 -0.1968
(0.1179) (0.22) (0.22)
∆PerCapitaIncomet−6 0.0822 0.5151 0.5230
(0.1163) (0.29) (0.29)
∆PerCapitaIncomet−9 0.0839 -0.4162 -0.4239
(0.1147) (0.22) (0.22)
∆Populationt−3 0.0007 -1.9381 -2.9313
(0.0032) (15.36) (15.15)
∆Populationt−6 0.0007 -8.7563 -8.9708
(0.0032) (19.71) (19.47)
∆Populationt−9 0.0007 9.4201 9.4280
(0.0032) (13.61) (13.45)
∆UnemploymentRatet−3 0.0024 -0.0244 -0.0247
(1.0520) (0.02) (0.02)
∆UnemploymentRatet−6 0.0043 -0.0036 -0.0042
(1.0566) (0.02) (0.02)
∆UnemploymentRatet−9 0.0017 -0.0342 -0.0336
(1.0595) (0.02) (0.02)
Mean Fatalities 0.9180 -0.0113
(2.1624) (0.02)
Mean Per Capita Income 23.5650 0.0399*** 0.0406***
(5.5560) (0.01) (0.01)
Mean Population 0.7913 0.0723 0.0521
(2.8652) (0.11) (0.11)
Mean Unemployment Rate 5.8096 -0.0351* -0.0350*
(2.1631) (0.02) (0.02)
Per Capita Income in 1991 15.6959 -0.1125*** -0.1132***
(3.5939) (0.01) (0.01)
Population in 1991 0.7196 -0.0841 -0.0708
(2.6652) (0.11) (0.11)
Unemployment Rate in 1991 6.9824 -0.0255* -0.0259*
(3.3308) (0.01) (0.01)
N Obs. 425,579 425,579 425,579
Note: * represents p<0.05, ** represents p<0.01, and *** represents p<0.001. Standard errors
presented in parentheses and standard errors are clustered by counties.
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Table 1.4: Ban HandHeld - Fatalities (Person)
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Handheld Ban
· Primary -0.4735*** -0.5051*** -0.4756*** -0.5038*** -0.4897*** -0.0948***
(-6.60) (-6.13) (-6.56) (-6.88) (-6.79) (-9.03)
· Secondary -0.0042 -0.0746 -0.0505 -0.0790 -0.0686 -0.0165
(-0.07) (-1.61) (-0.77) (-1.34) (-1.15) (-1.33)
Texting Ban
· Primary -0.1447*** -0.0291***
(-3.62) (-3.69)
· Secondary -0.0841* -0.0304**
(-2.46) (-2.59)
Per Capita Income -0.0001 -0.0016 -0.0001 0.0005 0.0008 0.0001
(in $1,000) (-0.04) (-0.48) (-0.03) (0.15) (0.23) (0.18)
Population -0.2144 -0.2348 -0.2134 -0.2170 -0.2161 0.0132
(in 100,000) (-0.61) (-0.66) (-0.60) (-0.61) (-0.61) (1.26)
Unemployment Rate -0.0052* -0.0047 -0.0053* -0.0055* -0.0056* -0.0032***
(-2.06) (-1.81) (-2.03) (-2.11) (-2.17) (-7.67)
Constant 0.9876*** 1.0158*** 0.7282*** 0.9883*** 0.9557*** 0.9964*** 0.3715***
(4.63) (4.71) (34.95) (4.64) (4.70) (4.82) (17.88)
School Bus Ban No No No No Yes Yes Yes
Novice Driver Ban No No No No Yes Yes Yes
Time Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
County Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N Obs. 454,337 454,337 478,344 454,337 454,337 454,337 454,337
Note: * represents p<0.05, ** represents p<0.01, and *** represents p<0.001. T-statistics
presented in parentheses and standard errors are clustered by counties. From columns 1-6 we
define the dependent variable as the number of individual fatalities. In column 7 we define
Ycms as log(number of individual fatalities + 1) to provide an easy way to interpret the effects
of the policy in percentage terms.
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Table 1.5: Ban HandHeld - Fatalities (Accident)
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Handheld Ban
· Primary -0.4219*** -0.4421*** -0.4240*** -0.4453*** -0.4335*** -0.0928***
(-6.36) (-6.04) (-6.33) (-6.66) (-6.54) (-8.44)
· Secondary -0.0077 -0.0634 -0.0490 -0.0709 -0.0615 -0.0207
(-0.13) (-1.56) (-0.83) (-1.34) (-1.16) (-1.71)
Texting Ban
· Primary -0.1222*** -0.0282***
(-3.36) (-3.56)
· Secondary -0.0738* -0.0274*
(-2.44) (-2.51)
Per Capita Income -0.0010 -0.0023 -0.0009 -0.0004 -0.0002 -0.0000
(in $1,000) (-0.32) (-0.72) (-0.31) (-0.14) (-0.06) (-0.05)
Population -0.1263 -0.1445 -0.1254 -0.1285 -0.1277 0.0191
(in 100,000) (-0.39) (-0.45) (-0.39) (-0.40) (-0.40) (1.79)
Unemployment Rate -0.0032 -0.0028 -0.0033 -0.0034 -0.0035 -0.0022***
(-1.36) (-1.14) (-1.36) (-1.43) (-1.48) (-5.55)
Constant 0.6934*** 0.7186*** 0.5032*** 0.6941*** 0.6690*** 0.7036*** 0.2413***
(3.58) (3.67) (30.57) (3.60) (3.64) (3.75) (12.01)
School Bus Ban No No No No Yes Yes Yes
Novice Driver Ban No No No No Yes Yes Yes
Time Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
County Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N Obs. 454,337 454,337 478,344 454,337 454,337 454,337 454,337
Note: * represents p<0.05, ** represents p<0.01, and *** represents p<0.001. T-statistics
presented in parentheses and standard errors are clustered by counties. From columns 1-6 we
define the dependent variable as the number of fatal accidents. In column 7 we define Ycms as
log(number of fatal accidents + 1) to provide an easy way to interpret the effects of the policy
in percentage terms.
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Table 1.6: Ban Texting - Fatalities (Person) and Fatalities (Accident)
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
A. Personal Fatalities
Texting Ban
· Primary -0.2154*** -0.2122*** -0.2223*** -0.2043*** -0.1447*** -0.0291***
(-4.91) (-4.07) (-5.10) (-4.52) (-3.62) (-3.69)
· Secondary -0.0315 -0.0608* -0.0699* -0.0440 -0.0841* -0.0304**
(-0.88) (-1.99) (-2.03) (-1.28) (-2.46) (-2.59)
Handheld Ban
· Primary -0.4897*** -0.0948***
(-6.79) (-9.03)
· Secondary -0.0686 -0.0165
(-1.15) (-1.33)
B. Fatal Accidents
Texting Ban
· Primary -0.1861*** -0.1811*** -0.1923*** -0.1749*** -0.1222*** -0.0282***
(-4.75) (-3.96) (-4.94) (-4.32) (-3.36) (-3.56)
· Secondary -0.0304 -0.0568* -0.0637* -0.0384 -0.0738* -0.0274*
(-0.95) (-2.09) (-2.05) (-1.24) (-2.44) (-2.51)
Handheld Ban
· Primary -0.4335*** -0.0928***
(-6.54) (-8.44)
· Secondary -0.0615 -0.0207
(-1.16) (-1.71)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
School Bus Ban No No No No Yes Yes Yes
Novice Driver Ban No No No No Yes Yes Yes
Time Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
County Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N Obs. 454,337 454,337 478,344 454,337 454,337 454,337 454,337
Note: * represents p<0.05, ** represents p<0.01, and *** represents p<0.001. T-statistics
presented in parentheses and standard errors are clustered by counties. Controls include per
capita income in $1,000, population in 100,000 inhabitants and unemployment rate. All regres-
sions include a constant. From columns 1-6 we define the dependent variable as the number of
individual fatalities (panel A) or the number of fatal accidents (panel B). In column 7 we define
Ycms as log(number of individual fatalities + 1) (panel A) or log(number of fatal accidents + 1)
(panel B) to provide an easy way to interpret the effects of the policy in percentage terms.
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Table 1.8: Ban HandHeld - Fatalities and Fatal Accidents - Heterogeneity
Variable Personal Fatalities Fatal Accidents
(1) (1-log) (2) (2-log)
Handheld Ban CA -0.9388*** -0.1032*** -0.7691*** -0.0942***
(-4.30) (-5.99) (-4.32) (-5.55)
Handheld Ban CT -0.2706* -0.0761* -0.2703* -0.0799*
(-2.33) (-1.97) (-2.25) (-2.03)
Handheld Ban DC -1.6008*** -0.4002*** -1.6898*** -0.4450***
(-31.95) (-53.28) (-36.31) (-60.86)
Handheld Ban NJ -0.5281*** -0.1426*** -0.4911*** -0.1528***
(Primary) (-4.10) (-4.97) (-3.80) (-4.79)
Handheld Ban NJ -0.0075 -0.0081 0.0102 -0.0022
(Secondary) (-0.07) (-0.36) (0.11) (-0.10)
Handheld Ban NY -0.3489*** -0.0811*** -0.3198*** -0.0788***
(-4.08) (-6.12) (-3.88) (-5.65)
Handheld Ban UT -0.0335 -0.0106 -0.0499 -0.0222
(-0.45) (-0.62) (-0.77) (-1.36)
Handheld Ban WA -0.1473 -0.0456 -0.1372 -0.0520*
(-1.44) (-1.89) (-1.41) (-2.15)
N Obs. 454,337 454,337 454,337 454,337
Note: * represents p<0.05, ** represents p<0.01, and *** represents p<0.001. T-statistics
presented in parentheses and standard errors are clustered by counties. All regressions include
a constant. Controls include per capita income in $1,000, population in 100,000 inhabitants
and unemployment rate. Regression also include month-year and county fixed effects. In
columns 1 and 2 we define Ycms as the number of individual fatalities and the number of fatal
accidents, respectively. In columns 1-log and 2-log we define the dependent variable as the
log(number of individual fatalities + 1) and log(number of fatal accidents + 1), respectively, to
provide an easy way to interpret the effects of the policy in percentage terms.
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Chapter 2
Effects of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act on
the Value-at-Risk of the Companies
Registered in the NYSE, Nasdaq and
Amex
2.1 Introduction
The Sarbanes-Oxley (SOX) Act, a corporate governance law approved on July of 2002 by
the US Congress, is a reaction to a series of corporate and accounting scandals in traditional
American companies such as Enron, Tyco International and WorldCom. These scandals
affected stock prices of the companies that collapsed, reflecting in a huge cost for investors
and negatively affecting public confidence in securities markets. The SOX is the most im-
portant reform implemented in American financial law since 1934. Its main objectives are to
protect investors from reductions of financial investments and losses caused by frauds in the
accountability reports of companies. This act imposes strict legal parameters for companies
with publicly traded stocks. The SOX creates several audit mechanisms, including rules for
the formation of oversight committees and reports.
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Some goals of the SOX are to avoid the occurrence of fraud and to guarantee that there
are ways to identify when they occur, ensuring transparency in business management by
creating mechanisms to improve the quality of financial reports. In cases of proven frauds, the
SOX imposes severe punishments to the directors, Chief Executive Officer (CEO) and Chief
Financial Officer (CFO) of the corporations, ranging from fines to prison sentences. These
penalties are also extended to external auditors who certify results with fraudulent numbers.
The Security and Exchange Commission (SEC) had been charged with the responsibility
of enforce the SOX. According to the SEC some of the effects for those companies that
violate the requirements of the SOX could be the following: higher risk of fraud, negative
advertising, and decreasing stock prices.
With the implementation of this Act, it is natural to ask the following: Did the SOX
influence the most used measure of extreme risk exposure - VaR? Does this influence vary
with different levels of the VaR? This study aims at investigating the impact of the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act (SOX) on the Value-at-Risk (VaR) of the companies that trade their bonds in the
New York Stock Exchange (NYSE), Nasdaq and American Stock Exchange (Amex). The
questions above can be answered by exploring the discontinuity generated by the SOX rules.
Identification comes from different deadlines to comply with the requirements of SOX ac-
cording to filer status defined by the Security and Exchange Commission. Accelerated filers,
those companies with equity market capitalization of at least US$75 million, with annual
reports for fiscal years ending on or after November 15, 2004 were required to comply with
SOX. The compliance deadline regarding filing a management’s report for non-accelerated
filers was extended until December 15, 2007, but they were exempt of providing an outside
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auditor’s attestation as a consequence of the Dodd-Frank Act1.
Given the discontinuity in this problem - companies above the threshold of $75 million
in equity market capitalization are exposed to treatment and those below are never exposed
-, we implemented a Regression Discontinuity Design approach to investigate the effects of
the SOX on the VaR of the companies. Since the SOX is intended to give more transparency
to investors, a smaller risk for bonds of companies that complied with the law requirements
is expected. On the other hand, the requirements of the SOX impose a higher auditing cost
(Asthana, Balsam, and Kim, 2004; Block, 2005; Iliev, 2010), which could eventually reduce
the market value of the companies and, then, negatively affect the return of their securities.
The analysis will be performed for various probability levels of the VaR, with emphasis on
1%, 5% and 10%, which are the most common levels used either for regulatory reporting or
internal financial control.
The major contribution of this study is the attempt to elucidate the causal effects of
the SOX on the VaR. Other strategy is to evaluate the heterogeneous effect of the SOX on
different levels of the VaR. Since the SOX introduced major changes to the regulation of
financial practice and corporate governance, and motivated by the debate on its economic
impact, it is worthwhile to investigate whether the SOX altered significantly this measure of
extreme risk exposure.
There is a lack of studies regarding causal effects of SOX, especially in risk measures.
Studies devoted to analyze the effects of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act show contradictory opinions.
On one hand, Berger, Feng, and Wong (2005) pointed out some positive effects of this act for
1These deadlines are for American companies. Non-American companies have also different deadlines.
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the companies such as incremental legal bonding. Lai (2003) shows that financial statements
of the companies tend to be associated with lower discretionary accruals after the enactment
of the SOX. Rezaee and Jain (2003) also argue that the market reacted positively to the
proposed solution for the more compliant companies. Li, Pincus, and Rego (2004) provide
evidence of abnormal returns associated to the SOX event. On the other hand, other studies
point out negative effects of the SOX. Asthana, Balsam, and Kim (2004) investigated the
effect of SOX on audit fees. Audit fees paid by clients and also the premium charged by
the Big 4 audit firms increased in 2002, and it was larger for bigger and riskier clients.
Block (2005) argues that the cost of compliance with the legislation may be prohibitive for
small cap firms. Holmstrom and Kaplan (2003) argue that costs of implementation of the
SOX may be greater than the benefits, since a complete elimination of frauds can be very
costly and may impose some restrictions to the management of the companies. Zhang (2007)
comments that an inquiry realized by the PriceWaterhouseCoopers among CEOs during the
2004’s World Economic Forum indicates that 59% said that a super-regulation is one of
the biggest barriers to the growth of their firms. Zhang (2007) argues that the cumulative
abnormal return around the events leading to the passage of SOX is statistically insignificant
and the findings challenge the value of the SOX as a protection for the shareholders. Soares
(2008), by using the structural break test for quantile regression proposed by Qu (2007),
showed a relation between the SOX event and the date of the most remarkable structural
change in the Value-at-Risk of a group of companies that trade their bonds in the NYSE,
especially for the VaR of 10% and 5%. His conclusion was based on the relative frequency
of break dates in the period of one year around the date of implementation of the SOX.
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Iliev (2010) investigated the impact of the Section 404 of the SOX on earnings quality, cost
and stock prices. The Sox imposed a reduction in stock prices, caused by a higher cost in
audit fees by complying with the law. Small firms suffered a significant increase of 98% in
cost. Moreover, firms tend to have lower discretionary accruals. Our paper differs from Iliev
(2010) to the extent that it seeks to understand the effects of the SOX on a risk measure,
focusing on the investors’ side.
Our dataset comes from different sources. We obtained data on stock return, stock
closing price, number of common shares outstanding, and firm classification according North
American Industry Classification System (NAICS), from The Center for Research in Security
Prices (CRSP). Dow Jones Industrial Average (DJIA) was obtained from the Wall Street
Journal and Dow Jones & Company. Data on auditor’s opinion, management’s report,
fundamentals, and Standard Industry Classification Code (SIC) were obtained from the
Compustat and AuditAnalytics. From the Edgar database of the SEC, we collected the
10-K forms where the market value and accelerated filer status were available.
Our estimates show a lower variability of the Value-at-Risk in the period of implemen-
tation of the SOX for all levels of probability investigated. Preliminary graphical analysis
based on nonparametric regression suggests a negative effect of the SOX on the Var of 5%.
For the VaR of 1% and 10%, we observed virtually the same pattern for the two groups
of firms (treatment and control). One concern is whether the firms could manipulate their
public float in order to evade compliance. Histogram of public float indicates a jump in
the bin immediately before the cutoff point suggesting presence of some manipulation. A
formal test was conducted to investigate further this matter. Based on the McCrary Density
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Test we failed in rejecting the null hypothesis of no discontinuity in the assignment variable.
The Regression Discontinuity Design method did not find any significant impact of the SOX
on the VaR for the levels of 1%, 5% and 10%. Data from 2002 indicate that there is no
manipulation in the public float, and then it was used as an instrument for predicting the
probability of submitting management’s report and auditor’s attestation. Results reinforced
our findings of absence of significant effects of the SOX. We are investigating the program
impact considering a small window around the cutoff point, and these results cannot be
extrapolated to the firms outside the range considered in the present study.
This paper is divided as follows. In the next section we present an overview of the SOX.
Section 3 presents the methodology. Data is described in Section 4. Our results are discussed
in Section 5. Section 6 concludes.
2.2 Implementation of Sarbanes-Oxley Act
In the beginning of 2000s, Enron, Adelphia, Tyco International, and WolrdCom were
responsible for some of the all-time greatest corporate and accounting scandals affecting
severely shareholders and fragmenting public confidence of stock markets. Through account-
ing manipulations the companies exhibited fictitious huge profits giving the appearance of
highly profitable businesses. After unveiling fraudulent accounting practices, those compa-
nies collapsed and the stock prices plummeted reflecting in a huge cost to investors.
The Sarbanes-Oxley (SOX) Act, Publication Law 107-204, 116, Stat. 745, was enacted
on July 30, 2002 as a response for such scandals and is intended “to protect investors by
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improving the accuracy and reliability of corporate disclosures made pursuant to the securi-
ties laws, and for other purposes” (H.R. 3763–107th Congress: Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002,
2002). Sections 302 and 404 state the obligations of managements and outside auditors. Sec-
tion 302, which became effective earlier, refers to the corporate responsibility for financial
reporting. Internal accounting controls are under the responsibility of the CEO and CFO.
They must review the financial reports, indicating the existence of any misrepresentation,
deficiencies or frauds in the documents. Section 404 refers to the management assessment of
internal controls. It states, in subsection (a), that each issuer must include a management’s
report regarding the effectiveness of the internal control structure and procedures in the end
of the most recent fiscal year report (10-K filings). Subsection (b) states that registered
outside auditors must attest to, and report on, the exactitude of the management’s report
of the firm.
The Security and Exchange Commission (SEC) holds primary responsibility for enforcing
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, among other statutes. On September 5, 2002, the SEC created filer
categories through the SEC Release No. 33-8128. American companies that have public float
of $75 million or more, that have been subject to the reporting requirements of the Security
Exchange Act for a period of at least 12 calendar months, and that have filed at least one
annual report previously, were considered accelerated filers. The firms must indicate their
filer status on their annual reports on form 10-K as of the end of their first fiscal year ending
on or after December 15, 2002. The deadline for reporting their 10-K was 90 days after their
fiscal year end.
Section 404 was implemented on June 5, 2003 through the SEC Release No. 33-8238. A
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company classified as an accelerated filer as defined by the Rule 12b-22 must comply with the
management’s report on internal control over financial reporting in its 10-K for its first fiscal
year ending on or after June 15, 2004. The internal control report must include an assessment
of management regarding the effectiveness of the internal control structure and procedures
as well as a statement of the responsibility of the management for maintaining an adequate
internal control, and an attestation of a registered external auditor on the management’s
assessment. According to the SEC Release No. 33-8238, non-accelerated filers and foreign
companies were required to comply with the internal control over financial reporting for its
first fiscal year ending on or after April 15, 2005.
The SEC Release No. 33-8392 extended the compliance dates on February 24, 2004.
The deadline for accelerated filers to comply with management’s report on internal control
over financial reporting in its 10-K was postponed for its first fiscal year ending on or after
November 15, 2004. Non-accelerated filers and foreign companies were required to comply
with the internal control over financial reporting for its first fiscal year ending on or after
July 15, 2005.
After November 15, 2004, the submission of management’s assessment on internal control
over financial reporting and attestation of outside auditor together with company’s 10-K
became effective. However, the deadline for non-accelerated companies suffered consecutives
postponements3. Regarding the submission of management’s report of internal controls,
2Companies with aggregated market value of at least $75 million as of the last business day of the
most recent completed second quarter, that has been subject to the Security Exchange Act’s reporting
requirements for at least twelve calendar months, and that have filed at least one annual report previously.
3Foreign companies have also experienced extensions in their deadlines, but these companies are not the
main focus of this study.
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its deadline was postponed to July 15, 2006 (SEC Release No. 33-8545), to July 15, 2007
(SEC Release No. 33-8618), and to December 15, 2007 (SEC Release No. 33-8760) when
it finally became effective. Auditor’s attestation report on internal control also suffered
different extensions. Non-accelerated companies were initially required to submit attestation
of external auditors for its first fiscal year ending on or after December 15, 2008 (SEC Release
No. 33-8760). It was postponed to December 15, 2009 (SEC Release No. 33-8934), and
to June 15, 2010 (SEC Release No. 33-9072). As a result of the Dodd-Frank Act, non-
accelerated filers became exempt of submitting attestation of an external auditor together
with their 10-K (SEC Release No. 33-9142). The SEC implemented the Section 404 (c)
on September 21, 2010, stating that Section 404 (b) of the SOX Act shall not apply for
non-accelerated filers.
In sum, accelerated filers or large accelerated filers must comply with the Section 404 of
SOX for fiscal years ending on or after November 15, 2004. Non-accelerated filers have never
been required to comply with the Section 404 (b), but they must comply with Section 404
(a) for fiscal years ending on or after December 15, 2007. Regarding foreign companies, large
accelerated filers were required to submit a management’s report and auditor’s attestation
on internal controls for fiscal years ending on or after July 15, 2006. Accelerated filer must
submit management’s report for fiscal years ending on or after July 15, 2006 and must submit
auditor’s attestation for fiscal years ending on or after July 15, 2007. Foreign non-accelerated
filers have never been required to submit auditor’s attestation, but they must comply with
Section 404 (a) for fiscal years ending on or after December 15, 2007.
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In the next section, we present the methodology proposed to evaluate the impact of this
law on the Value-at-Risk of the companies.
2.3 Methodology
In this section we present the econometric approach used to investigate the impact of the
SOX in the Value-at-Risk of the companies with publicly traded stocks in the NYSE, Nasdaq
and Amex. We start by discussing our functional form for the VaR and its estimation, and
then we describe our regression discontinuity design method.
2.3.1 Value-at-Risk (VaR)
The Value-at-Risk (VaR) is the most used measure of extreme risk exposure since the
Basel Agreement. This measure helps the investors to quantify the risk of extreme loss to
which their investments in securities, or portfolio, are subject in a certain period of time, for
a given confidence level. It is used both for regulatory reporting and for internal financial
control in the financial industry. A financial institution should specify the time horizon and
the confidence level to characterize the potential loss on the portfolio. For instance, for a
time horizon of 1 day and a confidence level of 95%, if the estimated Value-at-Risk was -0.02,
then on 95% of the trading days the portfolio loss will not exceed 2%, in average. If a loss
exceeds the threshold it is called a VaR break (Holton, 2003).
The Value-at-Risk of a portfolio gives the loss associated to an extreme event with a
certain probability τ for a given time horizon and is defined as:
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Pr (Rt ≤ V aRt (τ) |Ft−1) = τ
where Rt represents the return of the portfolio, Ft−1 is the information set in period t−1,
and τ ∈ (0, 1).
2.3.2 Estimation of the Value-at-Risk
The Value-at-Risk is a conditional quantile by definition. Chernozhukov and Umantsev
(2001) explain that Quantile Regression allows the direct modeling of conditional VaR, using
only the pertinent information that determines the quantiles of interest. In this study, we
will focus in the percentiles 1%, 5% and 10%, which are the most common for either internal
control or regulation.
Following Chernozhukov and Umantsev (2001), we can write the VaR in terms of a linear
model of conditional quantile function:
V aRt (τ) = F
−1
Rt
(τ |Xt) = X˜tγ (τ) (2.1)
where X˜t represents any desired transforms of Xt (k-dimensional information vector),
including a constant. This vector is commonly composed by lagged stock returns, stock
prices, market indexes, interest rates, spreads, etc. We will describe our controls below.
F−1Rt (·|Xt) is an inverse of the conditional quantile function.
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We estimate the VaR using a simple linear location-scale specification
Rt = X˜tα + X˜tλut (2.2)
where ut is independent of Xt, E (ut) = 0 and E (u
2
t ) = 1, and both X˜tα (location) and
X˜tλ > 0 (scale) are parameterized as linear functions. The location and the squared scale
represent the conditional mean function and the conditional variance, respectively. We can
identify λ by imposing scale restrictions, e.g. ‖λ‖ = 1.
Denoting the distribution function of ut by Fu, model (2.2) could be associated to a linear
conditional quantile model defined by:
V aRi,t (τ) = X˜i,tα + X˜i,tλF
−1
u (τ) = X˜i,tγ (τ) (2.3)
Equation (2.3) represents the conditional V aR(τ) of the company i at period t. This
specification is used to calculate our dependent variable, where X˜i,t is composed by lagged
stock returns (Ri,t−1), lagged Dow Jones Industrial Average Index (DJIAt−1), lagged Excess
Return on the Market (RM,t−1 − rf ), and a constant term.
Rewriting equation (2.3):
V aRi,t (τ) = µi + γ1i(τ)Ri,t−1 + γ2i(τ)DJIAt−1 + γ3i(τ) (RM,t−1 − rf ) + ui,t (2.4)
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The linear conditional quantile function (2.3) can be estimated by solving:
γˆ (τ) = argmin
γ
∑
t
ρ
(
Rit − X˜i,tγ
)
(2.5)
where ρτ (u) = u (τ − I(u < 0)).
2.3.3 Identification and Regression Discontinuity Design
Our analysis of the impact of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, specifically Section 404, on the
Value-at-Risk of the companies uses a Regression Discontinuity Design (RDD) approach.
Regression Discontinuity Design was introduced by Thistlethwaite and Campbell (1960) as
an alternative to estimate the effects of a treatment when it is determined by an assignment
variable, but the RDD has received more attention in the last years in evaluating economic
program impacts (Black, 1999; Angrist and Lavy, 1999; Hahn, Todd, and van der Klaauw,
2001). The main idea behind the RDD is that the group just below the threshold is a
good comparison to the group just above the threshold. We exploit the discontinuity in the
assignment variable (public float) to compare the Value-at-Risk of the companies that are
below and above the threshold.
As detailed in the previous section, the SEC created filer status for annual reports. Firms
with public float of at least US$75 million are considered accelerated filers. For fiscal year
ending on or after November 15, 2004, all accelerated filers must comply with the Section 404
42
of the SOX by submitting a management’s report on internal control over financial reporting
together with an attestation of an external auditor in their 10-K form. Non-accelerated filers
must comply with Section 404 (a) for fiscal years ending on or after December 15, 2007, by
submitting a management’s report, but they became exempt of complying with Section 404
(b) to submit auditor’s attestation.
We will focus on the first 12 months after November 15, 2004, comprising the first year
in which accelerated companies were required to comply with Section 404. We will compare
the outcomes of interest for companies belonging to a window of US$70 million around the
sharp discontinuity of US$75 million, that is, those companies with aggregate market value
between US$40 million and US$110 million.
We are adopting the following specification in the estimation of the VaR:
Yi = α + βSOXi + f(MVi, SOXi) +Xδ +  (2.6)
where Y is our outcome of interest - VaR of 1%, 5% and 10%-, SOX is a dummy variable
for treatment status, it assumes 1 for accelerated filers that submitted their management’s
report, MV is the assignment variable - public float-, f(·) is some smooth function of the
assignment variable, which may include interactions with the outcome, X is a vector of
controls, specifically measures for firms and industry classification, and β is our coefficient
of interest, the marginal effect of the SOX on the VaR.
Since the companies could manipulate their public floats in 2004 to evade compliance
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given the exorbitant audit costs, then we proceed in two stages. In the first stage, we
estimate the probability of submitting management’s report and auditor’s attestation given
by the model:
SOXi = µ0 + µ1I(MV 2002)i + ν (2.7)
where SOX is defined as above, I(MV 2002) is a dummy variable if company’s public
float in 2002 exceeds US$75 million. We are using the public float in 2002 as instrument
for filing management’s report and auditor’s attestation in 2004 since the companies did
not know the implementation rule at that time. In the second stage, we use the predicted
probability of submitting management’s report and auditor’s attestation in equation (2.6).
In the next section we present the data used in this study.
2.4 Data
In this section we describe the data used in the analysis. We also explain the sample
selection procedure to analyze the impact of the SOX on the VaR.
We obtained data on stock return, stock closing price, number of common shares out-
standing, and firm classification according North American Industry Classification System
(NAICS), from The Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) for companies that trade
their stocks in the NYSE, Nasdaq and Amex. The Dow Jones Industrial Average (DJIA) is
one of the best known stock index in the United States and was created by Wall Street Journal
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and Dow Jones & Company. Data on auditor’s opinion, management’s report, fundamen-
tals, and Standard Industry Classification Code (SIC) were obtained from the Compustat
and AuditAnalytics. Data on the aggregate market value as of the last business day of the
most recently completed second fiscal quarter and accelerated filer status were obtained from
the annual 10-K fillings of each company available in the Edgar database of the SEC. We
collected monthly data from January of 1994 to December of 2012 for the data obtained
from the CRSP. Information regarding other variables was collected in annual basis.
The dividend adjusted return on a asset of company i at period t is defined in the usual
way:
Ri,t =
Pi,t − Pi,t−1 +Di,t
Pi,t−1
where Pi,t and Di,t and represent the stock price and dividend adjustment for company
i at period t. The excess return on the market is the difference between weighted return on
all NYSE, Nasdaq and Amex stocks and 1-month Treasury bill rate.
The Dow Jones Industrial Average Index is calculated based on the sum of the prices of
the component stocks of 30 American companies (manufacturers of industrial and consumer
goods, financial services, entertainment, information technology, etc.) divided by a divisor,
the Dow Divisor, which is adjusted in case of stock splits, spinoffs or similar structural
changes, to ensure that such events do not in themselves alter the numerical value of the
DJIA. The DJIA serves to provide a clear, straightforward view of the stock market.
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The North American Industry Classification System (NAICS) is the standard used by
Federal statistical agencies in classifying business establishments for the purpose of collecting,
analyzing, and publishing statistical data related to the U.S. business economy. It was
developed to allow for a high level of comparability in business statistics among the North
American countries. Table 2.1 gives the distribution of the companies according NAICS
industry sectors.
Our analysis consider only American companies since the requirements of the Section 404
of the SOX affect directly these companies on November 15, 2004 and foreign companies have
different deadlines. Thus, we kept those companies with United States incorporation, which
represents almost 87% of the initial sample. Moreover, we exclude financial firms (those
companies with SIC between 6000 and 6999), trusts and funds, because these companies were
under similar regulations at the time of SOX implementation. We also excluded companies
that submitted variations other than the annual 10-K forms such as 10KSB and 10KSB40
because these forms do not provide information about public float.
We initially calculated the market value of equity for each company and period by mul-
tiplying stock closing price by company’s outstanding shares. We kept firms with market
equity between US$25 million and US$250 million for fiscal year ending between November
15, 2004 and November 14, 2005 in order to reduce the number of hand collected data from
annual 10-K fillings4. From this subset, we hand collected data on the market capitalization
as of the last business day of the most recently completed second fiscal quarter. Finally,
4We opted for this strategy since the market value of equity is a good approximation for the public float.
The float is obtained by considering the number of shares in possession of public shareholders, that is, by
deducting the number of restricted shares from the number of outstanding shares and then multiplying it
by the stock closing price.
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we selected those companies with market capitalization between US$40 million and US$110
million. Then we ended up with a sample of 334 companies in the neighborhood of the cutoff
point of US$75 million. From this set, 79.94% of the companies, 267, trade their stocks in
the Nasdaq, while 36 companies trade in the NYSE and 31 in the Amex.
Nine companies among accelerated filers did not provide the attestation of the auditor.
Among these ten companies, three of them reported being accelerated filers even with a
public float below US$75 million, and six of them failed to provide an attestation of external
auditor. From the entire sample, 39 companies reported being accelerated filer even with a
public float below the cutoff point, and 14 reported being non-accelerated filers even with a
public float above the cutoff point. We separated companies into treatment group if the filed
a management’s report and an auditor’s attestation together with their annual 10-K filings.
Our final sample contains 162 control and 172 treatment companies.
In the next section we present the main results of our analysis.
2.5 Results
In this section we report our empirical findings of the impact of the SOX on the VaR of
companies with publicly traded stocks. We proceed in two steps: first, estimating the VaR
of 1%, 5% and 10%, and, second, fitting our RDD to evaluate the impact of the program.
We begin by estimating equation (2.4) to establish our dependent variable. We used all
information available on dividend adjusted returns, Dow Jones Industrial Average Index,
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and excess return on the market from 1994 to 2012 for all companies in our final sample to
estimate the Value-at-Risk at 1%, 5%, and 10%.
Figures 2.1 and 2.2 show a comparison between returns and the estimated VaR of 1%,
5% and 10% for a treatment and a control company. We observe a lower variability of this
risk measure in the period of implementation of the SOX for all level of probability.
The second step in our analysis is to estimate a Regression Discontinuity Design to
investigate the impact of the Sox in the Value-at-Risk. In this stage we begin by investigating
the presence of manipulation of the public float. If it is the case, then the RDD may be invalid
(Lee and Limieux, 2010). There is an exorbitant audit cost for accelerated companies in
submitting management’s report and auditor’s attestation. These costs may make plausible
that some companies situated close to the cutoff of US$75 millions could find beneficial to
manipulate their public float and avoid being classified as accelerated filers. For instance,
these companies may repurchase public shares in hand of stockholders to reduce their public
float sufficiently to stay exempt of the requirements of the Section 404, and then our estimates
may be biased. Figure 2.3 shows the histogram of the public float. We observe that the
number of firms situated just before the cutoff point is substantially higher when compared
to the two bins immediately after the threshold. This scenario suggests that those firms
could have manipulated their public float to avoid compliance.
In order to check more precisely the existence of manipulation, we proceed with the
McCrary test to verify if there is a discontinuity in the density of the public float by using
a local linear regression with frequency within the bins as dependent variable (McCrary,
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2010). Figure 2.4 shows the McCrary density test for manipulation of public float. Although
there is a jump in the density just before the cutoff point, we are unable to reject the null
hypothesis of no discontinuity given the confidence interval for the density in the right hand
side of the cutoff point.5
Figure 2.5 shows the histogram of the public float for 2002. The number of firms just
before the threshold is higher when compared to the bin just after the cutoff point. However,
this difference is not too remarkable as in 2004. In the histogram regarding to the year
2004, the bin just before the cutoff is higher than the bin in US$65 million and than the
two bins immediately after the cutoff. We may consider, based in the histogram, that
there is no manipulation during 2002. In addition, the companies did not know about the
implementation rule of the Section 404 two years before it.
Next we plot the VaR for each percentile of all companies under consideration against the
public float to have an idea of the response of our regression discontinuity design approach.
This analysis tests whether the program has any influence on the outcome, by showing a
discontinuity in the cutoff point. In addition, theses graphs provide some guidance to select
the adequate polynomial order of the public float in our functional form for the model used
to estimate the effect of the treatment on the accelerated filers.
Figures 2.6-2.8 show the relationship between the VaR of 1%, 5% and 10% and the
public float. We included two types of nonparametric regression, one for the entire sample
and another for each subsample (treated and control companies). The graph for the whole
5Iliev (2010) has found a manipulation of the public float. Although our histogram suggest the same, the
McCrary test failed to reject the null hypothesis of no discontinuity in the assignment variable.
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sample suggests that we may have a functional form of third order for the public float
variable. Regarding the estimation for each subsample, and considering the VaR of 1%,
there is a very small discontinuity in the regression curves, suggesting that there is no effect
of the treatment. Considering the VaR of 10%, the discontinuity is marginally larger than
the discontinuity in the VaR of 1%. The discontinuity is more evident in the VaR of 5%,
suggesting that there might have some impact of the program on the Value-at-Risk.
The effect of the SOX on the VaR is then estimated by implementing the parametric
specification described on equation (2.6). We considered different functional forms for the
assignment variable including polynomials up to degree four and interactions. The model
without interaction implies that the slope of the relationship between VaR and public float
is constrained to be the same on both sides of the threshold. Models with interactions allow
for differences on both the intercept and slopes of the regression for control and treatment.
The results for each level of the VaR are given in Tables 2.2-2.4. In each table, the
first column indicates what is the form of the polynomial expression of the public float and
whether it contains interactions with the treatment variable. The second and third columns
provide our main coefficient of interest and its standard error. The last two columns give
information criterion based on Akaike and Schwarz methods to help us in choosing the
appropriate for our dataset.
Table 2.2 shows the results for the VaR of 1%. In either set of models, with or without
fixed effects for industry classification, both criteria indicate that the linear model without
interactions as the most appropriate form. The estimated effect of the SOX has different
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interpretation comparing the two models chosen. In the model without fixed effects, the
SOX has a negative impact in the VaR of 1%, that is, the loss to which the investor in the
treatment group is exposed is higher with the implementation of the SOX, while the model
with fixed effects points to a positive impact. However, both are statistically insignificant.
Tables 2.3 and 2.4 show the results for the impact of the SOX on the VaR of 5% and
10%. Here the AIC and BIC differ about the choice of the appropriate model, AIC indicates
the model with a fourth degree polynomial form while the BIC points to a linear model for
either VaR 5% or 10%. Both criteria point to a linear model in the case of inclusion of fixed
effects. Regarding the VaR of 5%, all estimated coefficients suggest a positive impact of
the program. The positive treatment effect indicates that the investor is subject to a lower
loss with the implementation of the SOX for the companies in the treatment group. The
interpretation for the VaR of 10% is similar to the first case, however the coefficients present
a small magnitude, with some of them almost equal to zero. In addition, the coefficients are
statistically insignificant. The benefits of the SOX such as giving more transparency to the
companies are offset by its disadvantage. It imposes a higher cost to the company involving
additional auditing such that affect its value, and then reducing the return of its stocks. Iliev
(2010) suggests that there is a significant reduction in the stocks of the companies affected by
the program. Our results indicate that there is no effect in the loss to which the stockholder
is exposed.
The results above refer to the dependent variable measured as of the month that each
company filed its 10-K form. Using this procedure we are assured that all companies have
filed their annual forms when estimating treatment effect through the RDD approach. One
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concern is that the firms could be affected differently over time; for instance, the systematic
risk may produce shocks in a given month with different magnitude than in the previous
month. Tables 2.5-2.7 present results for the RDD using the Value-at-Risk estimated in the
same period for all companies. We chose to use the VaR calculated on October of 2005 since
all companies have filed their 10-K after twelve months of the implementation of the Section
404.
Results show that all coefficients representing the impact of the program are negative,
indicating that the loss to which the investor in the treatment group is exposed is higher
with the implementation of the SOX. Moreover, all linear models are considered to have the
best-fit according Akaike and Schwarz criteria. However, as in the previous analysis, these
coefficients are statistically insignificant, the SOX seems to have no impact on the VaR for
all levels of probability.
Lastly, we proceed with an instrument variable approach to estimate the probability of
submitting management’s report and auditor’s attestation given the possibility of public float
manipulation in 2004. Table 2.8 shows the results for model (2.6) where SOX is estimated
in the first stage by using equation (2.7). The results are similar to the previous estimation
- coefficients are mostly negative and all of them are statistically insignificant. These results
reinforces the absence of effects of the SOX on the VaR of all probability levels.
52
2.6 Conclusion
This study aimed at investigating the impact of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act on the Value-at-
Risk of the companies that trade their bonds in the New York Stock Exchange, Nasdaq and
Amex. In the beginning of 2000s some companies were involved in corporate and accounting
scandals affecting shareholders. The SOX created audit mechanisms to avoid fraud and to
detect when it occurs, then providing more transparency in business management.
We exploited a discontinuity generated by the SOX rules to investigate the impact of
the program on the VaR. Accelerated filers with annual reports for fiscal years ending on
or after November 15, 2004 were required to comply with the requirements of the law. We
implemented a Regression Discontinuity Design to compare outcomes around the cutoff point
to evaluate the program.
One of the most concerns with the SOX was the huge audit cost imposed to the com-
panies complying with the law. The histogram of public float indicated that the companies
manipulated their public floats to avoid compliance in 2004, but this pattern was not evident
in 2002.
The SOX demonstrated to have a negative impact on the VaR of 1% and 10%, while, for
the VaR of 5%, it presented a positive effect. Using the VaR calculated in the same period
for all companies, the results show a negative impact of the SOX indicating that the investor
would be subject a higher potential loss with the implementation of the law. However, we
were not able to verify any significant effect. One explanation is that the benefits of the
SOX such as giving more transparency to the companies are perfectly offset by the higher
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cost faced by the companies subject to the Section 404. Another reason is that the control
group was aware of the upcoming regulations and anticipated compliance requirements.
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2.7 Tables
Table 2.1: Number of treatment and control companies by sector according to the North
American Industry Classification System.
Sector Treatment Companies Control Companies
Agriculture, Forestry, Fishing and Hunting 0 1
Mining, Quarrying, and Oil and Gas Extraction 2 8
Utilities 2 4
Construction 2 1
Manufacturing 83 93
Wholesale Trade 5 6
Retail Trade 5 5
Transportation and Warehousing 5 5
Information 26 16
Professional, Scientific, and Technical Services 17 9
Administrative and Support and
8 4
Waste Management and Remediation Services
Educational Services 2 1
Health Care and Social Assistance 9 5
Arts, Entertainment, and Recreation 2 1
Accommodation and Food Services 3 1
Other Services 1 2
Source: CRSP
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Table 2.2: Regression Discontinuity Design - VaR of 1%
Model Treatment St. Error AIC BIC
Without fixed effects
Linear -0.1476 (1.65) 2611 2622
Linear with interaction 0.0911 (1.78) 2613 2628
Quadratic -0.1121 (1.66) 2613 2628
Quadratic with interaction 0.6581 (2.15) 2616 2639
Cubic -0.3222 (1.66) 2613 2632
Cubic with interaction -1.6477 (2.47) 2616 2646
Quartic -0.2717 (1.67) 2615 2638
Quartic with interaction -3.3738 (2.70) 2617 2655
With fixed effects
Linear 0.5877 (1.67) 2614 2682
Linear with interaction 1.1058 (1.79) 2615 2688
Quadratic 0.5898 (1.67) 2616 2688
Quadratic with interaction 1.6283 (2.19) 2619 2699
Cubic 0.4316 (1.67) 2617 2693
Cubic with interaction -0.1761 (2.51) 2621 2708
Quartic 0.4298 (1.68) 2619 2699
Quartic with interaction -2.0301 (2.75) 2621 2716
Note: * represents p<0.05, ** represents p<0.01, and *** represents p<0.001. Standard errors
presented in parentheses. Sample size: 330.
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Table 2.3: Regression Discontinuity Design - VaR of 5%
Model Treatment St. Error AIC BIC
Without fixed effects
Linear 0.3765 (1.11) 2349 2360
Linear with interaction 0.4712 (1.19) 2351 2366
Quadratic 0.3535 (1.11) 2350 2366
Quadratic with interaction 0.5382 (1.45) 2354 2377
Cubic 0.1235 (1.11) 2348 2367
Cubic with interaction -1.6462 (1.65) 2351 2382
Quartic 0.3029 (1.12) 2347 2370
Quartic with interaction -1.8496 (1.81) 2352 2390
With fixed effects
Linear 0.7792 (1.11) 2348 2417
Linear with interaction 0.9381 (1.20) 2350 2423
Quadratic 0.7639 (1.11) 2350 2422
Quadratic with interaction 1.0800 (1.46) 2354 2434
Cubic 0.5934 (1.12) 2349 2425
Cubic with interaction -0.5368 (1.68) 2353 2441
Quartic 0.7295 (1.12) 2349 2428
Quartic with interaction -0.4694 (1.84) 2355 2450
Note: * represents p<0.05, ** represents p<0.01, and *** represents p<0.001. Standard errors
presented in parentheses. Sample size: 330.
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Table 2.4: Regression Discontinuity Design - VaR of 10%
Model Treatment St. Error AIC BIC
Without fixed effects
Linear -0.0645 (0.86) 2177 2188
Linear with interaction -0.1150 (0.92) 2179 2194
Quadratic -0.0449 (0.86) 2179 2194
Quadratic with interaction -0.0528 (1.11) 2183 2205
Cubic -0.1914 (0.86) 2178 2197
Cubic with interaction -1.4173 (1.28) 2182 2212
Quartic -0.0263 (0.86) 2176 2198
Quartic with interaction -1.4797 (1.39) 2179 2217
With fixed effects
Linear 0.1621 (0.85) 2172 2240
Linear with interaction 0.1944 (0.92) 2174 2246
Quadratic 0.1703 (0.85) 2173 2246
Quadratic with interaction 0.4232 (1.12) 2177 2257
Cubic 0.0599 (0.85) 2173 2249
Cubic with interaction -0.4330 (1.29) 2178 2266
Quartic 0.1786 (0.86) 2172 2252
Quartic with interaction -0.3475 (1.40) 2177 2272
Note: * represents p<0.05, ** represents p<0.01, and *** represents p<0.001. Standard errors
presented in parentheses. Sample size: 330.
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Table 2.5: Regression Discontinuity Design - VaR of 1% - October 2005
Model Treatment St. Error AIC BIC
Without fixed effects
Linear -2.7753 (1.44) 2473 2484
Linear with interaction -2.8682 (1.53) 2475 2490
Quadratic -2.7490 (1.45) 2474 2489
Quadratic with interaction -2.4245 (1.90) 2478 2500
Cubic -2.8878* (1.46) 2475 2494
Cubic with interaction -3.1491 (2.14) 2481 2511
Quartic -2.8511 (1.47) 2477 2500
Quartic with interaction -3.7904 (2.40) 2484 2522
With fixed effects
Linear -1.7888 (1.43) 2463 2531
Linear with interaction -1.5819 (1.52) 2465 2536
Quadratic -1.7886 (1.43) 2465 2536
Quadratic with interaction -1.4499 (1.90) 2468 2548
Cubic -1.8898 (1.44) 2466 2542
Cubic with interaction -1.8737 (2.13) 2472 2558
Quartic -1.9354 (1.45) 2468 2547
Quartic with interaction -2.4132 (2.40) 2475 2570
Note: * represents p<0.05, ** represents p<0.01, and *** represents p<0.001. Standard errors
presented in parentheses. Sample size: 323.
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Table 2.6: Regression Discontinuity Design - VaR of 5% - October 2005
Model Treatment St. Error AIC BIC
Without fixed effects
Linear -1.7379 (1.14) 2317 2329
Linear with interaction -1.7971 (1.21) 2319 2335
Quadratic -1.7242 (1.14) 2319 2334
Quadratic with interaction -1.5646 (1.50) 2323 2346
Cubic -1.8407 (1.15) 2320 2339
Cubic with interaction -2.3384 (1.68) 2326 2356
Quartic -1.7275 (1.15) 2322 2344
Quartic with interaction -3.1555 (1.89) 2328 2365
With fixed effects
Linear -1.1943 (1.13) 2311 2379
Linear with interaction -1.1425 (1.20) 2313 2385
Quadratic -1.1941 (1.13) 2313 2385
Quadratic with interaction -0.7610 (1.50) 2317 2396
Cubic -1.2886 (1.14) 2314 2390
Cubic with interaction -1.1593 (1.68) 2320 2407
Quartic -1.2484 (1.14) 2316 2395
Quartic with interaction -1.5715 (1.89) 2323 2418
Note: * represents p<0.05, ** represents p<0.01, and *** represents p<0.001. Standard errors
presented in parentheses. Sample size: 323.
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Table 2.7: Regression Discontinuity Design - VaR of 10% - October 2005
Model Treatment St. Error AIC BIC
Without fixed effects
Linear -1.3774 (0.94) 2197 2209
Linear with interaction -1.3805 (1.00) 2199 2215
Quadratic -1.3585 (0.94) 2199 2214
Quadratic with interaction -1.4127 (1.24) 2202 2225
Cubic -1.3731 (0.95) 2201 2219
Cubic with interaction -1.4932 (1.40) 2206 2236
Quartic -1.2891 (0.96) 2202 2225
Quartic with interaction -2.0616 (1.57) 2207 2245
With fixed effects
Linear -1.0213 (0.94) 2195 2263
Linear with interaction -0.9062 (1.00) 2197 2268
Quadratic -1.0210 (0.94) 2196 2268
Quadratic with interaction -0.7955 (1.25) 2199 2279
Cubic -1.0297 (0.95) 2198 2274
Cubic with interaction -0.5720 (1.40) 2203 2290
Quartic -1.0069 (0.96) 2200 2279
Quartic with interaction -0.8587 (1.58) 2206 2300
Note: * represents p<0.05, ** represents p<0.01, and *** represents p<0.001. Standard errors
presented in parentheses. Sample size: 323.
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Table 2.8: Regression Discontinuity Design - Instrumental Variable
Model Treatment St. Error
Without fixed effects
Linear - VaR 1% -0.9250 (3.84)
Linear - VaR 5% -1.8216 (2.46)
Linear - VaR 10% -2.1965 (1.92)
With fixed effects
Linear - VaR 1% 1.7819 (3.90)
Linear - VaR 5% 0.0349 (2.48)
Linear - VaR 10% -1.0926 (1.93)
Note: * represents p<0.05, ** represents p<0.01, and *** represents p<0.001. Standard errors
presented in parentheses. Sample size: 297.
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Figure 2.1: Return x VaR for a Treatment Company.
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Figure 2.2: Return x VaR for a Control Company.
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Figure 2.3: Histogram of Public Float for Manipulation of Assignment Variable - Year 2004.
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Figure 2.4: McCrary Density Test for Manipulation of Assignment Variable.
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Figure 2.5: Histogram of Public Float for Manipulation of Assignment Variable - Year 2002.
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Figure 2.6: Scatter Plot of VaR of 1% versus Public Float.
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Figure 2.7: Scatter Plot of VaR of 5% versus Public Float.
69
40 50 60 70 80 90 100 110
-4
0
-3
0
-2
0
-1
0
0
Public Float (in millions of dollars)
V
aR
(.1
0)
Treatment observation
Control observation
Cutoff
Piecewise local smoother
Full local smoother
Figure 2.8: Scatter Plot of VaR of 10% versus Public Float.
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Chapter 3
Is There a Kuznets Curve for Brazil?
An Investigation Using Bayesian
Model Averaging and Nonparametric
Model Selection
3.1 Introduction
In the last years Brazil has become one of the major emerging countries in the world
and was ranked by World Bank as the ninth largest economy. Brazil, along with China,
Russia and India, form a group of countries at a similar stage of newly advanced economic
development, known as BRIC. According to the Wilson, Kelston, and Ahmed (2010), these
countries have contributed over a third of world GDP growth and grown to almost a quarter
of the world economy in the last decade. Projections point that the BRIC, as an aggregate,
will overtake the US by 2018. Hundreds of millions of people entered the middle class1 and
it is expected to rise even further in the next decade.
With this promising development scenario, we expect greater investments in public infras-
1People whose incomes are greater than $6,000 and less than $30,000.
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tructure and human capital in order to improve life conditions in Brazil. Economic growth
is fundamental for improving the Human Development Index (HDI) and reducing poverty
and economic inequality. Neri (2007) argues that the proportion of people below the poverty
line2 fell by 18.47% and by 19.18% in the periods 1993-95 and 2003-05, respectively, and
it reached 19.37% in 2006 based on a study of the Center for Social Policies (CPS/FGV).
At that time, Brazil had accomplished the first goal of the millennium development goals
(MDGs) by reducing extreme poverty by 50% in 25 years. Conditional cash transfer pro-
grams, such as Bolsa Escola and Bolsa Famı´lia, were introduced in order to further improve
the quality of life and reduce income inequality. Brazil is ranked 73rd, based on the HDI of
the Human Development Report 2010, below many countries with lower nominal GDP than
Brazil. According to Brazil National Household Survey (BRASIL. IBGE., 2009), the Gini
index3 has decreased from 0.547 (2004) to 0.518 (2009). However, if compared to other coun-
tries, the Gini index is similar to countries of medium or low human development. Moreover,
42.5% of total income is concentrated with 10% of richest population while the 10% poorest
have only 1.2% of total income.
These facts about economic growth and income inequality in Brazil raise the following
question: Is the recent economic growth of Brazil sufficient to reduce economic inequality?
One way to look at this question is through the Kuznets curve, which represents the relation-
ship between economic inequality and economic growth (Kuznets, 1955). With this in mind,
this study proposes to estimate the Kuznets curve for the Brazilian municipalities, by using
2Population with per capita income below R$125.00 per month.
3Gini index of the distribution of monthly wages of people who age 10 or older.
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both a parametric and a non-parametric approaches, and to identify the key determinants
of inequality.
Kuznets (1955) proposed a model in which there is a transition of economic activity from
the agricultural to the industrial sector by using data from United States, Germany and the
United Kingdom. This reallocation produces an increase in inequality until a certain point
in which a more egalitarian distribution of income begins, thus configuring an inverted-U
curve which became known as Kuznets curve. The increase in economic inequality, in the
first moment, could be related to differences in incomes between the two sectors. This insight
about whether economic inequality could be related to economic growth generated substan-
tial research to discover whether or not this relationship was valid. Fields (2001) argued that
the literature went into two directions: one focused on developing theoretical models and
another was to assess the Kuznets curve empirically. We will focus on the empirical side. We
can refer to Robinson (1976), Bourguignon (1990), Galor and Tsiddon (1996), Fields (1980)
and Alesina and Rodrik (1976) as important references on the theoretical side. Regarding
empirical studies, Ahluwalia (1976) used different specifications to estimate cross-country
regressions. Different percentage income shares were used as inequality measure and the
log of per capita GNP, growth rate of GDP, literacy rate, share of urban population and
other demographic variables were used as explanatory variables. Their results support the
Kuznets hypothesis. Ahluwalia (1976) also shows that improvements in the quality of human
resources play an important role in reducing inequality, and the growth rate of population
has a negative effect on income shares. The share of agriculture in GDP is positively and
negatively related to income shares of the middle and highest income groups, respectively.
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Anand and Kanbur (1993) used a cross-section estimation using the same data from 60 coun-
tries as Ahluwalia (1976). The sensitivity of the estimates to alternative functional forms
is investigated, and their results indicate that Ahluwalia’s results are not robust to such
variations, that is, some functional forms support the inverted-U hypothesis while others do
not. Fields and Jakubson (1994) used cross-section and panel data models in a sample of
20 countries. The Kuznets hypothesis was validated by using the cross-section model, but
in the panel data the model rejected it. The latter shows a negative relationship between
inequality (Gini index) and the level of development (GNP). One possible explanation is
that Latin American countries have higher inequality while their per capita GDP lies in the
middle group of countries.
With respect to studies involving Brazil, Jacinto and Tejada (2009) estimated the Kuznets
curve for cities of the Northeast from 1970 to 1991 by using cross-section and panel data
models. Per capita income and the Theil L index were the measures for development and
inequality, respectively. Their results do not reject the existence of the inverted-U curve.
Salvato et al. (2006) tested Kuznets hypothesis for cities in Minas Gerais, Brazil. Cross-
section and panel data models were used in their analysis. The Theil L index and Gini
index were used as measures of inequality while the measure for development was per capita
income. There is evidence for the inverted-U curve proposed by Kuznets and the results
suggest that cities do not have similar trajectories of economic development. Barros and
Gomes (2008) tested the Kuznets curve for Brazilian cities from 1991 to 2000. Gini and
Theil L indexes were used as inequality measures while per capita income and share of
urban population were used as development measures. Using panel data model and different
74
functional forms, Barros and Gomes (2008) conclude that there is little evidence in favor of
Kuznets hypothesis.
As noted above, the question regarding the existence of a Kuznets curve has been largely
studied. Nonetheless, neither empirical nor theoretical studies give clear evidence about
the correct functional form or the appropriate variables to be included in the model. We
note that the aforementioned studies use different econometric models, functional forms and
estimation strategies as well as several inequality measures (e.g. Gini and Theil L indexes,
percentage income share of the poorest 20%) and development measures (e.g. GDP, per
capita income) and the results are still controversial. The contribution of this paper is mainly
empirical in dealing with model uncertainty. This study aims at using a Bayesian Model
Averaging (BMA) and a non-parametric model selection approach suggested by Henderson,
Papageorgiou, and Parmeter (2012), by using both local constant least squares (LCLS) and
local linear least squares (LLLS), to estimate the Kuznets curve since there is uncertainty
about which explanatory variables we should include in the regression. We try to demystify
which factors explain economic inequality in Brazil and expose the key its determinants.
The idea behind BMA is to estimate all possible candidate models and compute a weighted
average of the coefficients of the variables of main interest and the weights are determined
by the posterior model probability. In the non-parametric approach, we use LCLS to select
relevant variables and then we use LLLS and variables selected from LCLS to determine
linearity and calculate partial effects. In this approach, we have kernel weighting functions
with a bandwidth for each (continuous and discrete) covariate (Li and Racine, 2007), instead
of only one for all regressors.
75
The literature regarding BMA focused at investigating growth determinants and mainly
after the late 1990s. Hoeting et al. (1999) discuss different methods to implement BMA and
present examples of application. Fernandez, Ley, and Steel (2001b) used the BMA in cross-
country regressions to deal with model uncertainty since economic theory does not provide
guidance in which variables should be included in the analysis. They highlight that BMA
performs best than any single model by using a dataset provided by Sala-i Martin (1977).
Masanjala and Papageorgiou (2008) show that the key growth determinants in Africa differ
from Non-African countries by applying a BMA approach. Education, primary exports
and mining play an important role in explaining economic growth in Africa based in the
Sala-i Martin (1977) dataset. There is a huge lack of studies involving income inequality
and economic growth using model averaging techniques. To the best of my knowledge, the
sole work is Hopkins (2004) which found that economic growth has a positive and linear
relationship with inequality. The data used by Hopkins (2004) was obtained from Deininger
and Squire (1996) consisting of an unbalanced panel data set. There is a lack of reliable
statistics for income distribution and this data set is considered an improvement over previous
sources, but it is also recognized that “the information included is often of dubious quality”
(Deininger and Squire, 1996, p.567). Our data set benefits of being uniform with respect to
the construction of the income inequality variables.
Results show a lack of evidence for the existence of a Kuznets curve, in the Bayesian
Model Averaging approach, for both dependent variables: Theil L and Gini indexes. Our
analysis consider two scenarios: one in which variables related to per capita income are kept
fixed and the remainder variables are under uncertainty such that they can appear in a
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given equation or not; and another in which all variables are under uncertainty. Estimates
using Theil L index as dependent variable seem to be closer to the Kuznets concept in which
inequality increases with economic growth, but it turns to decrease after a given level of
income. However, the Kuznets curve could not be validated by the presence of the positive
coefficient of the cubic term indicating that inequality increases again for highest income
levels. The nonparametric approach confirms the nonlinearity of this relationship, but we
cannot affirm if it has an inverted U shaped curve. The key determinants in reducing
inequality include education and provision of basic service. Current Expenditure and State
Tax Transfers to Municipalities seem to have no influence on the inequality
We proceed as follows: in the next section we discuss the model. The data used to
estimate the Kuznets curve is presented in section 3. Section 4 presents the results. Section
5 contains our conclusion.
3.2 Methodology
We begin by discussing the model used to estimate the Kuznets curve. We note that the
aforementioned studies use different econometric models, functional forms and estimation
strategies as well as several inequality measures (e.g. Gini and Theil L indexes, percentage
income share of the poorest 20%) and development measures (e.g. GDP, per capita income).
We implement a Bayesian Model Average approach in which the weights are selected by the
posterior model probability. These weights are used to calculate a weighted average of the
coefficients of main interest.
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The general model is given by the following expression:
yi = αi + β1incomei + β2income
2
i + β3income
3
i +
k∑
j=1
θjxji + i (3.1)
where y, income, income2, income3 and the error term are N ×1 vectors representing an
income inequality measure (Gini or Theil L indexes), per capita income, its square and cubic
terms, and a normal iid error term with variance σ2, respectively, where N is the number of
observations. We add a cubic term for per capita income to capture any response of economic
inequality to economic growth, which could represent a different shape for the traditional
Kuznets curve. We suppose there exists uncertainty about the appropriate model, so xji’s are
N × 1 vectors representing k uncertain explanatory variables such as government transfers,
share of urban population, literacy rate, etc. - all variables are defined below. There are 2k
candidate models to be estimated. The main parameters of interest are β1, β2, and β3. The
θjs are the remaining parameters to be estimated representing additional key determinants
of inequality income in Brazil.
The ideal general model would be to include all possible available regressors. Due to
computational constraints we selected, first, the most frequently used regressors in previous
studies and then those which are more relevant and available in the database to the analysis4.
We designed two scenarios to implement BMA. In the first scenario, per capita income, its
quadratic and cubic terms are fixed to be present in all models. The intuition is that the
4Some regressors discarded were very close related to each other. For instance, there exist four vari-
ables related to water services. We chose the one that is more correlated to the others in order to avoid
multicollinearity.
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coefficients of these variables are of primordial interest since they will validate or not the
existence of the Kuznets curve. The remaining variables - totaling 15 variables5 - are under
uncertainty, they may or may not appear in the equations. Therefore we have 32,768 possible
equations to be estimated which are represented by the permutation of the fifteen variables.
In the second scenario, we do not keep per capita income terms as fixed. Instead, we treat
them as under uncertainty so that we have 262,144 possible equations to be estimated -
permutation of the eighteen variables.
Considering the second scenario, equation (3.1) can be written in matrix notation as,
y = Z∆ +  (3.2)
 ∼ N(0, σ2IN)
where Z = [1 incomei income
2
i income
3
i x1i x2i . . . xki] and
∆ = (α, β1, β2, β3, θ1, θ2, . . . , θk)
′. There are 2k possible models to be estimated represented
by Mh, h = 1, . . . , 2
k. For instance, if Xh is not included in the model, then δh - the
corresponding coefficient of Xh in the vector ∆ - is set to be zero (Fernandez, Ley, and Steel,
2001b; Raftery, Madigan, and Hoeting, 1997).
The least squares estimate of ∆h = (α, β1, β2, β3, θ1, . . . , θkh)
′, for a given model Mh, is
5The variables are current expenditure in proportion to GDP, state tax transfers to municipalities in
proportion to GDP, governmental transfers, school attendance, literacy rate, infant mortality, share of urban
population, percentage of people with electrical service, percentage of people with water service, population
density, dummy for cities in the North and Northeast regions, current revenue in proportion to GDP, per-
centage of people with waste service, life expectancy, and Human Development Index (HDI). Description of
each variable is in Appendix.
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∆ˆh = (Z
′
hZh)
−1Z ′hy for all h ≤ 2k where Zh is the N ×kh matrix with ij th element xji. Take
µh = Zh∆h. We have a set of linear estimators
{
µˆ1, µˆ2, . . . , µˆ2
k
}
for µ6. Model selection
selects an estimator from this set. The hth estimator can be written as µˆh = Zh∆ˆh = Phy
where Ph = Zh(Z
′
hZh)
−1Z ′h.
The main coefficients of interest in the BMA approach are calculated by a weighted
average of the estimated coefficients for all 2k models. The weights for each model are given
by the following posterior model probabilities obtained from Bayes’ theorem:
P (Mh | y,X) = P (y |Mh, X)P (Mh | X)
P (y | X) =
P (y |Mh, X)P (Mh | X)∑2k
j=1 P (y |Mj, X)P (Mj | X)
(3.3)
where P (Mh | X) is the prior on the model space and P (y | Mh, X) is the marginal
likelihood of model Mh given by:
P (y |Mh, X) =
∫
P (y | ∆h,Mh, X)P (∆h |Mh, X)d∆h (3.4)
The posterior for the parameters using model Mh is given by:
P (∆h | y,Mh, X) = P (y | ∆h,Mh, X)P (∆h |Mh, X)
P (y |Mh, X) (3.5)
6Where µ =
(
µ1, . . . , µN
)′
= Z∆.
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where P (∆h | Mh, X) is the prior for the parameter space, and P (y | ∆h,Mh, X) is a
likelihood.
The posterior distribution of the parameters for all models (or full posterior distribution
of ∆) is a weighted average of the posterior distribution for ∆ under each of the models with
weights given by the posterior model probabilities in equation (3.3):
P (∆ | y,X) =
2k∑
j=1
P (∆ | y,Mj, X)P (Mj | y,X) (3.6)
In order to implement the BMA described in equations (3.3)-(3.6) we have to elicit priors
for the model probability and for the parameters of each model. The decision about these
priors is a delicate task (Fernandez, Ley, and Steel, 2001b; Masanjala and Papageorgiou,
2008).
With respect with the prior on the model space, we assume a uniform distribution and
that regressors to be included in the model are mutually independent - and that each model
has the same prior probability. Thus, we are assuming that P (Mh | X) = 2−k implying
that the prior inclusion probability for any regressor is 1/2. This is a common choice in the
literature given our lack of knowledge on the distribution of model probability (Fernandez,
Ley, and Steel, 2001b; Masanjala and Papageorgiou, 2008).
Regarding the prior on the parameter space, a common choice lies on a conditionally
normal distribution on the coefficients ∆h given the nature of the normal regression frame-
work. The major impact on the posterior model probability comes from the choice of the
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distribution. We are avoiding improper priors7, which could lead to indefinite model prob-
abilities. This study uses a Zellner’s g prior following the standard literature. We assume
that coefficients follow a normal distribution with a prior mean of zero representing our lack
of knowledge and a prior variance proposed by Zellner given by:
∆h | σ2,Mh, g ∼ N(0, σ2g(X ′hXh)−1)
where g attributes the degree of uncertainty. Our choice of g is based on the Unit
Information Prior (g-UIP), g = N , proposed by Kass and Wasserman (1995). Although
there is no consensus about the choice for the prior on the parameter space (Fernandez,
Ley, and Steel, 2001a; Ciccone and Jarocinski, 2010), Eicher, Papageorgiu, and Raftery
(2009) show that using uniform prior on the model space and g-UIP on the parameter
space provides better performance compared to any other combination of priors regarding
predictive performance.
The analysis is analogous for the first scenario in which the variables for economic growth
are considered fixed.
Given the number of candidate regressors in this study, it becomes infeasible to enumer-
ate all possible models to be estimated and to calculate their posterior model probabilities.
Therefore, we use a Markov Chain Monte Carlo Model Composition (MC3) algorithm, pro-
posed by Madigan and York (1995), in order to approximate the posterior model distribution
7We are using improper priors of 1 and σ−1 on the intercept and error variance since they are common
to all models.
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by sampling from the model space. The sampler is based in a Metropolis-Hastings algorithm
working in the following way: suppose that the chain is in the current model Mj has a pos-
terior model probability of P (Mj | y,X). We randomly choose one of the k regressors in our
database and propose a new model M
′
j which is either the model Mj with the inclusion of
the chosen regressor if it was not included in the current model or a model with all regressors
composing Mj but the chosen variable if it was already included in the current model. In
other words, we are either including or excluding the chosen variable in the new model. The
chain moves to the new model M
′
j with probability:
pmc = min
(
1,
P (M
′
j | y,X)
P (Mj | y,X)
)
and remains in the current model Mj with probability 1−p. If the new model is rejected,
then we move to the next step and select a new candidate model. If the new model is
accepted, then it becomes the current model and will be tested against another model. The
posterior model probability is approximated by the number of times each model is sustained.
In this MC3 sampler, we proceed with 20 million retained iterations after a burn-in of
10 million drawings. Considering that we have to start with some model, it is plausible that
the starting model does not have a good fitness, and then the first drawings will not contain
models with higher posterior model probabilities. The iterations belonging to the burn-in
set of excluded drawings will not be likely to move through the set of models with largest
posterior model probabilities. Then this set of 10 million of drawings will be discarded, and
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the results will be calculated from the subsequent 20 million drawings.
Moreover, we proceed with a non-parametric model selection approach suggested by
Henderson, Papageorgiou, and Parmeter (2012), by using both local constant least squares
(LCLS) and local linear least squares (LLLS). The idea is, when we use an automated
selection of bandwidth, LCLS has the ability to detect irrelevant regressors, while LLLS has
the ability to detect linearity. The ideal general model would be given by the following:
yi = g(Xi) + ui (3.7)
where y is a vector representing an income inequality measure (Gini or Theil L indexes), X
represents a set of sixteen explanatory variables - all extra fifteen variables under uncertainty
from the first scenario above in addition to per capita income -, and g(.) is an unknown
function.
However, in this context the nonparametric estimation suffers from the “curse of dimen-
sionality” because the sparsity of data. To circumvent this problem, we use a semiparametric
partially linear estimation, in which the fifteen variables from the first scenario are assumed
to enter linearly in the equation, while per capita income is assumed to be possibly non-linear.
The model is given by:
yi = W
′
iβ + g(incomei) + ui (3.8)
E(ui|Wi, incomei) = 0
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E(u2i |Wi, incomei) = σ2
where y represents an inequality measure, and W is a set with the fifteen variables from
the first scenario.
We proceed in two steps. In the first step, we consider a LCLS. The bandwidth controls
the amount of local information to calculate a weighted average of the dependent variable
(Henderson, Papageorgiou, and Parmeter, 2012). In this approach, we have kernel weighting
functions with a bandwidth for each (continuous and discrete) covariate (Li and Racine,
2007), instead of only one for all regressors. According to Hall, Li, and Racine (2007), the
bandwidth indicates how regressors affect the dependent variable. A regressor is smoothed
out when its bandwidth reaches its upper bound. In the second step, we use a LLLS.
According to Henderson, Papageorgiou, and Parmeter (2012), “LLLS performs weighted
least-squares regressions around a point x with weights determined by a kernel function
and bandwidth vector”. A discrete regressor is smoothed out if its bandwidth equals its
upper bound, while continuous variables should enter linearly. As suggested by Hall, Li, and
Racine (2007), we estimate the bandwidth by using least squares cross-validation (LSCV),
and we use two standard deviations of the explanatory variable as the upper bound for either
relevance and linearity.
Alternatively, we also propose to use principal component vectors in the nonparametric
model. Since we are not interested in the coefficients of those additional explanatory vari-
ables, we could use principal component analysis in order to reduce the dimensionality of
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the data, and then apply a model selection based on a fully nonparametric estimation. The
model has the following form:
yi = g(Ri, incomei) + ui (3.9)
where y is a vector representing an income inequality measure (Gini or Theil L indexes),
R represents a set of principal component variables, and g(.) is an unknown function.
In the next section we present the data used in this study.
3.3 Data
The data used in this study were obtained from the Institute for Applied Economic Re-
search (Ipea), Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistic (IBGE), and National Treasury
Secretariat (STN). The dataset consists of inequality measures (Gini and Theil L indexes),
per capita income and other relevant variables such as share of urban population, literacy
rate, government transfers and other socioeconomic and demographic variables for 4617 mu-
nicipalities in the year 20008. Table 3.1, in Appendix, provides a description of the variables
used here.
Table 3.2 shows descriptive statistics for these variables. The Theil L and Gini indexes
range from 0.185 (Barra do Choc¸a/BA) to 1.271 (Miranda/MS) and from 0.358 (Barra do
Choc¸a/BA) to 0.804 (Santa Vito´ria do Palmar/RS), respectively. The median of the Theil
8Census 2010 was not available during this research.
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L and Gini indexes are 0.506 and 0.552 which is slightly below the mean, 0.517 and 0.5554,
respectively. The minimum per capita income is R$30.43, in Manari, Pernambuco, in the
Northeast region. Manari has the Theil L and indexes of 0.561 and 0.717 which are higher
than the average. For each 1,000 live births 109.67 infants are not expected to complete
one year of life (highest infant mortality in Brazil), 16.21% and 64.85% of population receive
water and electrical services, respectively, 42.99% are literate, the proportion of people living
in an urban area is 17.55%, and its HDI is 0.467 which is the lowest level of human devel-
opment in Brazil. On the other hand, A´guas de Sa˜o Pedro, Sa˜o Paulo, has the highest per
capita income - R$954.65. It presents a higher Theil L index if compared to Manari, 0.764,
but a smaller Gini index, 0.639. For each 1,000 live births 6.28 infants are not expected to
complete one year of life, all residents have water service and live in an urban area, 99.94%
have electrical service, 97.07% are literate, and its HDI is 0.908 which is considered a high
level of human development and the second largest in Brazil. The median of the per capita
income is R$177.49, below the average R$184.15. The infant mortality ranges from 5.377
(Sa˜o Caetano do Sul/SP) to 109.67 (Manari/PE) with median and average of 26.34 and
31.38, respectively. The literacy rate ranges from 39.34% (Jorda˜o/AC) to 99.09% (Sa˜o Joa˜o
do Oeste/SC) with median and average of 83.99% and 80.01%, respectively
Figure 3.1 shows kernel densities for the Gini and Theil indexes and for the per capita
income. The income inequality indexes exhibit similar shapes. They have a unimodal dis-
tribution. Per capita income has a bimodal distribution and it is negative skewed. Figure
3.2 shows a scatter plot of the Brazilian municipalities related to the Theil L index and per
capita income. The Theil L index is concentrated between 0.4 and 0.7 for the municipalities
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with lower per capita income. For cities with higher per capita income, the Theil L index
seems to be sparser. Figure 3.3 shows a scatter plot of the Brazilian municipalities related
to the Gini index and per capita income. For those cities with less than R$ 100.00 of per
capita income, the Gini index is concentrated between 0.5 and 0.65. For those cities with
per capita income around R$ 200.00, the Gini index is concentrated between 0.45 and 0.6.
For cities with higher per capita income, the Gini index is sparser.
Table 3.3 shows how the average of the Theil L index varies with different interval of
percentiles of the distribution of each variable. The intuition is to understand the behavior
of the income inequality when the value of each variable increases. The Theil L index
increases with the per capita income until the median where there is a decrease, configuring
momentarily an inverted-U curve, but it turns to increase again on the interval between the
75th and 90th percentile and thereafter. This first analysis of the data shows that the 10%
richest have a higher income inequality than the 10% poorest municipalities. In the interval
immediately below (above) the median we have the highest (lowest) inequality. Other results
suggest that cities with lower population density, share of urban population, literacy rate,
access to electrical and water services, or governmental transfers tend to have more economic
inequality.
Table 3.4 is similar to the previous analysis, but now we have the average of the Gini
index. The Gini index decreases from the lower tail of the per capita income distribution
until the 90th percentile, and then increases thereafter. In this simple analysis, we have a
situation of a U-shape curve. Differently from the previous analysis, 10% of the richest has
a lower income inequality than the 10% poorest municipalities. Similarly to the previous
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analysis, cities with lower population density, share of urban population, literacy rate, or
access to electrical and water services tend to have more economic inequality. Cities with
higher infant mortality tend to have a higher income concentration.
In the next section we discuss the results of the estimations for each proposed model.
3.4 Results
In this section we present the estimates of the coefficients for each scenario and each
dependent variable - Theil and Gini. The hypothesis of an inverted-U can be supported
whether the coefficients of per capita income and its square are positive and negative, re-
spectively, and no statistical evidence for a cubic term. The existence of the Kuznets curve
cannot be confirmed for any other result.
We start our analysis by the first scenario proposed above, using BMA in equation (3.1).
We assume that per capita income and its squared and cubic terms are fixed in the model
setting to be present in all regressions and, thus, the BMA is applied only to the remainder
subset of regressors. Table 3.5 shows the main results for the BMA estimation using the
Theil L index as dependent variable. The first column presents the posterior inclusion
probability for each regressor representing the importance of the regressor in explaining the
data. The regressors are ranked by order of importance. Since per capita income and its
squared and cubic terms were kept fixed in the model setting, then the posterior inclusion
probabilities for these regressors could not be different from 1. Raftery (1995) advocates that
variables with posterior inclusion probability greater than 50% are considered relevant. Nine
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regressors (governmental transfers, literacy rate, percentage of people with electrical, waste,
and water services, school attendance, life expectancy, HDI, share of urban population) are
most important - all posterior model mass spreads on models that include these covariates.
Current revenue and population density seem to have a higher degree of importance followed
by infant mortality and dummy for North and Northeast regions. Current expenditure and
State tax transfers seem to have little impact.
The second column shows the posterior mean, which represents the regressor coefficient
averaged over all models. We draw attention to the results for the covariates involving per
capita income which will validate or not the existence of Kuznets curve. The estimated
averaged coefficients indicate an increase in inequality with economic growth for lower levels
of income; it reaches a local maximum and starts to decrease. However the inequality tends
to increase again for the highest levels of income, and, thus, the data do not validate the
Kuznets curve. Additionally, it is crucial to verify if, in fact, these variables are effective.
Masanjala and Papageorgiou (2008) suggest that if the ratio of posterior mean/standard
deviation is greater than 1.3, in absolute value, then a variable is considered effective. This
threshold is equivalent to a 90% confidence interval in a frequentist approach. This ratio is
calculated in the last column of the Table 3.5 and all variables related to per capita income
are considered effective. Regarding the extra covariates under uncertainty, only current
expenditure and State tax transfers are not effective.
The fourth column gives the posterior probability of obtaining a positive coefficient con-
ditional on inclusion. For instance, in all models containing per capita income, this variable
presents a positive sign. Its square and cubic covariates present negative and positive signs,
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respectively, whenever they are included in a given model. Moreover, governmental transfers
and current expenditure seems to increase inequality, but their impact is close to zero. On
the other hand, an increase in the life expectancy and the literacy rate, and providing basic
services to population tend to decrease inequality.
Table 3.6 shows eight models that perform best ordered left-to-right by their posterior
model probability. A number 1 in each column indicates if a covariate is include in the
model, and 0 otherwise. The model that perform best includes all variables but current
expenditure and State tax transfers. These two covariates are also excluded for the five
models with best performance, which, together, account for 94.2% of cumulative posterior
model probability. This confirms they have little relevance in explaining the data.
Table 3.7 presents the results for the BMA approach with the Gini index as dependent
variable and the covariates related to per capita income are kept fixed in each model. Obvi-
ously, these regressors present posterior inclusion probability of 1. The estimated coefficients
averaged over all models related to these variables do not validate the Kuznets curve. The
estimated averaged coefficient for per capita income presents a negative sign (in fact, it is
negative in each model) and its squared variable is considered to be not effective.
Compared to the same scenario with Theil L index as dependent variable, there are fewer
variables with maximum posterior inclusion probability (literacy rate, percentual of people
with electrical and water services, school attendance, life expectancy, and HDI), and all of
them are also present in the set of the most important regressors in the previously mentioned
analysis. These variables, except HDI, demonstrate having a negative relationship with
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inequality in all models, which was expected. Four variables (people with waste service,
State tax transfers, current expenditure, and share of urban population) demonstrate to
have little relevance in the analysis in terms of the posterior probability of inclusion and of
effectiveness based in the ratio posterior mean/standard deviation. Regardless of the income
inequality measure, variables related to education and to provision of services of basic needs
are determinants in reducing inequality. On the other hand, State tax transfer and current
expenditure seem to be irrelevant.
Table 3.8 ranks models which perform best. Current expenditure, State tax transfer,
share of urban population, and people with waste service are excluded from the model that
performs best with posterior model probability of 63.4%. The first three variables are also
excluded from the four models with best performance accounting for 87.96% of posterior
model probability, and then confirming their little impact in explaining the data.
We now turn to examine the results for the second scenario in which all regressors are
under uncertainty and none of them is kept fixed in the model setting. Table 3.9 shows the
results for the BMA estimation using Theil L index as dependent variable. The first column
of results ranks all the variables by order of importance. Eleven variables (per capita income
cubic and squared, governmental transfers, literacy rate, school attendance, people with
electrical, water and waste services, life expectancy, HDI, and share of urban population)
are ranked as the most important variables with posterior inclusion probability of 1. Other
five variables (current revenue, population density, infant mortality, dummy for North and
Northeast region, and per capita income) also have high importance in explaining data. All
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these variables are considered effective, except per capita income which does not reach the
threshold.
The Kuznets curve is also not validate here. Inequality seems to increase for high level of
income after reaching a local minimum. All variables considered effective present averaged
estimated coefficients with expected sign, except infant mortality. For instance, an increase
in variables related to education and to provision of basic services help to reduce inequality.
As in the first scenario, current expenditure and State tax transfer seem to be irrele-
vant. This is confirmed by the low posterior inclusion probability and by the ratio posterior
mean/standard deviation. Moreover, theses variables are excluded from the first six mod-
els with best performance (Table 3.10), which, together, account for 88.18% of cumulative
posterior probability.
Table 3.11 shows the results for the BMA estimation using Gini index as dependent vari-
ables and keeping all variables under uncertainty. There are fewer variables with maximum
posterior inclusion probability if compared to the case with Theil L index as dependent vari-
able. Literacy rate, school attendance, life expectancy, HDI, and people with electrical and
water service present posterior inclusion probability of 1 and expected sign for the respec-
tive estimated coefficients. Other seven variables, which include per capita income and its
cubic variable, have also shown to have a high posterior inclusion probability. Excluding
per capita income cubic, all of them are considered effective. Per capita income squared has
shown relatively small importance in explaining the data, and, as the cubic measure for per
capita income, is considered not effective. In addition, the averaged estimated coefficient of
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per capita income presents a negative sign, which is contrary to what was expected. Thus,
again, the Kuznets curve is not validate.
As in the first scenario, four variables (people with waste service, State tax transfers,
current expenditure, and share of urban population) demonstrate to have little relevance in
the analysis in terms of the posterior probability of inclusion and of effectiveness based in
the ratio posterior mean/standard deviation. Moreover, the posterior inclusion probabilities
changed marginally, as in the Theil L case. These four variables are excluded from the first
four models with best performance (Table 3.12) which account for 67.3% of the cumulative
posterior model probability. In addition, for both dependent variables, the mass is more
spread out in the second scenario when all variables are under uncertainty than in the first
scenario when regressors related to per capita income are kept fixed.
The prior expected model size is 9, since we chose a uniform prior distribution for the
model space and we have eighteen explanatory variables. The mass is concentrated in in-
termediate model sizes as seen in Figure 3.4. The blue line shows the posterior model size
distribution for each scenario and dependent variable. It is clear that the posterior puts
more importance on non-parsimonious models for all cases. This is an indication that not
only economic development should be taken into account. There are other factors explaining
income inequality that deserve more attention. Based in the results above, education and
provision of basic services are the most important determinants of the inequality in Brazil
during the period analyzed. Improving these factors could help in reducing inequality before
taking other actions.
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By way of comparison we have included results for models selected by using the Akaike
and Schwarz information criteria as well as a basic model, in which the dependent variable
is regressed on the per capita income variables, and a complete model, in which all possible
regressors are included in the regression. Table 3.13 shows these results with Theil L index
as dependent variable. The first column shows the results for the basic model. Besides
the statistical insignificance for the squared and cubic terms, the coefficients for per capita
income and its squared term show an opposite sign if compared to those in the BMA approach
in both scenarios. In addition, the magnitude of the coefficients, in absolute value, differs
substantially. This is explained by the posterior model probability be very close to zero
of the correspondent model in the BMA approach (2.81e−251 and 1.88e−251 in the first and
second scenarios, respectively). The estimated coefficients for the complete model, second
column, present magnitudes more similar to the averaged estimated coefficients from the
first scenario, besides the low posterior model probability (0.07%).
Columns 3-6 present results for models selected by AIC and BIC for the first and second
scenarios. The results are identical for each selection criteria since they selected exactly the
same regressors in each scenario. The AIC was in favor of a model with all regressors but
State tax transfer, which was also excluded along with current expenditure according the
BIC. In both AIC and BIC, the estimated coefficients of main interest present a smaller
magnitude, in absolute value, if compared to the estimated coefficients in the first scenario
while we have an opposite situation compared to the second scenario. The Kuznets curve is
also not validated in these models because of the presence of the cubic term of per capita
income. By only taking into account the first two terms and, if it is the case of validating the
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Kuznets curve, considering the current plan of economic development as helping to diminish
economic inequality, it could increase gap between rich and poor. Averaging estimated
coefficient over all models, including those in which per capita income variables are under
uncertainty, produced results with smaller magnitude than in the traditional way. Model
selection criteria selected a model and took it as the true model and all the inference is based
on it, while the BMA approach considered a set of all possible models in which the true model
was belonging to. We are accounting for uncertainty in parameter estimate across different
models. By doing this, we are able to capture all possible effects of the regressors under
uncertainty on the dependent variables giving appropriate weights. The posterior model
probabilities of the model selected by the AIC and BIC in the BMA approach were 4.1%
and 65.9% in the first scenario and 2.7% and 44.01% in the second scenario, respectively,
which, in the BIC case corresponds to the models that perform best in each scenario. This
discrepancy could be explained by using a g-UIP prior (g = N) for the parameter space,
which leads the Bayes factor behaving as the BIC. The reminder explanatory variables
presented estimated coefficients with the desired influence with very few exceptions.
Table 3.14 show the results for this comparison analysis by using the Gini index as
dependent variable. The results for the basic model are presented in the first column.
Compared to the first and second scenarios, we observe a large difference in magnitude.
They provide a complete different interpretation, which could be crucial to the analysis.
However, the irrelevance of this model is verified by the posterior model probability of zero
in both first and second scenarios of the BMA approach. Regarding the complete model,
none of the coefficients related to per capita income are significant, but they are closer to
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the averaged estimates in BMA, showing a slightly higher magnitude, in absolute value. The
AIC, keeping per capita income variables fixed, selected a model which excludes current
expenditure and share of urban population and the coefficients changed marginally. They
still close to the coefficients of BMA in the first scenario, but all of the main coefficients are
insignificant (in the BMA case, only squared per capita income was considered not effective).
On the other hand, the BIC selected the model that excludes State tax transfers, people with
waste service, current expenditure and share of urban population. The magnitude of the
coefficients still very similar, but they are closer to the coefficients from BMA. This could
be explained by the fact that this model obtained the highest posterior model probability
of 63.4%. The AIC and BIC in the second scenario excluded the same variables as in the
first scenario in addition to per capita income squared. The main coefficients of interest
present, basically, the same value. We all these comparison analysis involving Gini index as
dependent variable, we did not find support for the Kuznets curve. Additionally, we also
estimate models with only per capita income and its squared term (thus, excluding the cubic
term) by using AIC and BIC. The results for both Theil L and Gini indexes do not support
the Kuznets curve. In fact, all models show a regular U-shapped curve, in which there would
be decreasing income inequality in the beginning due to an increase in the per capita income,
but inequality tends to increase thereafter.
Regarding the non-parametric approach, we begin by analyzing a simple nonparametric
model given by:
inequalityi = g(incomei) + ui (3.10)
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where inequality represents an inequality measure - Gini and Theil L indexes -, and
income represents per capita income. The bandwidths of per capita income from estimation
by LCLS are 11.5159 and 8.6765 by using Theil L index and Gini index as dependent variable,
respectively, which indicate that per capita income is relevant in our analysis since the
bandwidth does not exceed two standard deviations. In the second step, using a LLLS, the
bandwidths are 15.3146 and 8.5617, respectively, which indicate that the variable should
enter nonlinearly in the equation.
Figures 3.5a and 3.5b show a plot of the nonparametric estimation taking Theil L index as
dependent variable. Both graphs depict the same estimation, the only difference is that 3.5a
emphasizes the region in which per capita income varies from 0 to 400, which incorporates
98% of the sample, and the graph 3.5b presents the entire graph (the remaining figures
present the same structure, that is, the graph in the left shows the region from 0 to 400
of the per capita income from the complete graph in its right hand side). We observe an
inverted U-shaped curve only in the points around 100, however the entire graph informs that
the income inequality does not change with an increase in per capita income. Figures 3.5c
and 3.5d show the associated gradient vary with per capita income. The partial effect of per
capita income is very close to zero, except around 100 and 150 which produces the inverted
U-shaped curve in the previous figures. Taking Gini index as dependent variable - Figures
3.6a-3.6d -, we observe a U-shaped curve for observations with per capita income below
400. The gradient is close to zero, and then the entire graph shows that the relationship is
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basically constant. Another point is that there is a high volatility in the graph in the highest
2% of per capita income (above 400), a consequence of sparse data.
Now, using the semiparametric partially linear model specified in equation (3.8) we ob-
serve that per capita income is also relevant and enters nonlinearly in the model. The
bandwidths for per capita income in the LCLS step are 11.5159 and 8.6765 by using Theil L
index and Gini index as dependent variable, respectively. In the LLLS step the bandwidths
are 15.3177 and 9.6513, respectively. We do not verify a quadratic relationship, but we
confirm the nonlinearity.
We also proceed with a principal component analysis in order to reduce the dimension-
ality of data. In this analysis we are using five components, which account for 83.8% of the
variance. The use of additional components only increases slightly the cumulative proportion
of variance. Again, per capita income is also relevant and enters nonlinearly in the model.
The bandwidths for per capita income in the LCLS step are 11.4472 and 11.5069 by using
Theil L index and Gini index as dependent variable, respectively. In the LLLS step the
bandwidths are 8.6658 and 40.7510, respectively. We also present graphs from the nonpara-
metric estimation similar to the simplest case - Figures 3.7a - 3.7d and 3.8a - 3.8d. In either
case, income inequality tends to increase for higher values of per capita income, and this
increase in more prominent in the Theil L index case. For values above 400, the gradient is
not statistically different from zero, indicating that the inequality tend to be constant after
that.
In the nonparametric and semiparametric scenarios above, we conclude that the variable
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per capita income is relevant to the analysis, and it has a nonlinear relationship with in-
come inequality. The nonparametric model selection does not guarantee the existence of a
quadratic relationship, but it confirms that there exists some nonlinear connection between
these two variables.
3.5 Conclusion
This study aimed at investigating the hypothesis of the Kuznets curve, in which an
increase in income inequality continues until a certain point when a more egalitarian distri-
bution of income begins, thus configuring an inverted-U curve, for Brazilian municipalities.
By using a dataset composed by inequality measures, economic development and socioe-
conomic and demographic variables for the year 2000 obtained from Institute for Applied
Economic Research, Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistic, and National Treasury
Secretariat this research applied the Bayesian Model Average and a Nonparametric regres-
sion approaches in order to validate or not Kuznets’ hypothesis.
In both scenarios of BMA approach, when considering that per capita income variables
are kept fixed and under uncertainty, the results suggest that the Kuznets curve could not
be observed from the data using both Theil L index and Gini index as dependent variables.
For the Theil L index case, the Kuznets curve was not validated by the presence of the
cubic term, which was considered effective in our analysis and should be taken into account.
Thus, based on the premise stated by Kuznets, for higher levels of economic development
the inequality tends to increase again, which is not considered in the original hypothesis of
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Kuznets. By the fact that the Kuznets curve was not validated, we should consider how the
relationship is established, considering the role ofother factors that could determine a lower
level of inequality. Models selected by model selection criteria, AIC and BIC, show estimates
with higher magnitude than the averaged estimated coefficients from the BMA approach.
Variables related to education and provision of basic services such as water and electrical
services seem to have large impact in reducing income inequality. Brazilian authorities should
pay attention to their effects on economic inequality before trying to reduce the gap between
rich and poor using other alternatives. Demographic variables also play an important role
in explaining disparities. Lastly, some macroeconomic variables such as current expenditure
and State tax transfer seem to be irrelevant in our analysis. The posterior model size
distribution points to non-parsimonious models in all cases. There are other factors, besides
economic development, that explains income inequality that deserves more attention.
The nonparametric approach indicates that, in fact, there exists some nonlinear relation-
ship between income inequality and economic growth; although we cannot affirm it would be
quadratic. Even registering a promising development scenario, Brazil should pursue a more
appropriate policy for human and social development to keep up with economic growth and
reduce further this historically embedded problem of income inequality.
This research faced some problems. One problem was the lack of data for recent years.
The information regarding the last Census was not available at the period of conducting
this study. It is important to emphasize that State Tax Transfer to Municipalities was not
considered a relevant factor to reduce inequality, while Governmental Transfers has been
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considered relevant in the analysis. However, the later has shown to increase inequality,
though with a very small magnitude. The data used here comprehends the pre-Bolsa Fa-
milia period, one of the most important conditional cash transfer program implemented in
Brazil in the last thirteen years, which has been considered, by the Federal Government, an
indispensable instrument in helping to reduce poverty. It would be valuable to understand
the behavior of the Governmental Transfers on the inequality after the Bolsa Familia has
been put in effect. Another problem was of computational restrictions. Estimating model
averaging requires a considerable amount of virtual memory and the construction of the
scenarios partially corrected this problem. To conclude, future researches should include
investigating the Kuznets curve by using more recent data, and data from other countries.
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3.6 Tables
Table 3.1: Description of the Variables
Variable Description
i. Current Expenditure Amount spent in operations related to maintenance
in Proportion to GDP and implementation of public services.
ii. State Tax Transfers to Municipalities Current transfers from state to municipality
in Proportion to GDP in proportion to GDP.
iii. Governmental Transfers Transfers such as retirement payments, pensions, and conditional
cash transfer program as a percentage of the GDP.
iv. School Attendance Percentage of people between 7 and 14 years of age
who are attending school.
v. Literacy Rate Percentage of people above 15 years of age
who are literate.
vi. Infant Mortality Number of infant deaths (one year of age or younger)
per 1000 live births.
vii. Share of Urban Population Urban population as a percent of total population.
viii. Percentage of People Percentage of people with access to electricity.
with Electrical Service
ix. Percentage of People Percentage of people with access to water.
with Water Service
x. Population Density Number of people per squared kilometers.
xi. Dummy for Cities in the Dummy variable for municipalities
North and Northeast Regions in the North and Northeast regions.
xii. Current Revenue Municipality revenue as a percent of the GDP.
in Proportion to GDP
xiii. Percentage of People Percentage of people with access to public waste service.
with Waste Service
xiv. Life Expectancy Expected number of years of life remaining of a newborn.
xv. HDI Human Development Index.
Source: Ipea, IBGE and STN.
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Table 3.3: Average of Theil L Index
Variable < .10 .10− .25 .25− .50 .50− .75 .75− .90 > .90
Per Capita Income 0.5104 0.5187 0.5362 0.4986 0.5019 0.5414
Current Expenditure/GDP 0.5139 0.5260 0.5204 0.5173 0.5131 0.5028
State Tax Transfers to Municipalities/GDP 0.5423 0.5305 0.5290 0.5122 0.4950 0.4860
Governmental Transfers 0.5539 0.5074 0.5024 0.5175 0.5267 0.5149
Literacy Rate 0.5280 0.5296 0.5373 0.5146 0.4974 0.4710
Infant Mortality 0.4546 0.4858 0.5151 0.5440 0.5428 0.5244
Share of Urban Population 0.5105 0.5147 0.5303 0.5170 0.5088 0.5054
People with Electrical Service (%) 0.5453 0.5607 0.5385 0.5107 0.4730 0.4505
People with Water Service (%) 0.5287 0.5456 0.5529 0.5096 0.4790 0.4477
Population Density 0.5741 0.5297 0.5102 0.5088 0.5035 0.4978
School Attendance 0.5433 0.5441 0.5301 0.5115 0.4939 0.4650
Current Revenue/GDP 0.5157 0.5269 0.5187 0.5218 0.5076 0.5007
People with Waste Service (%) 0.5344 0.5498 0.5367 0.5141 0.4876 0.4520
Life Expectancy 0.5192 0.5510 0.5389 0.5111 0.4924 0.4601
HDI 0.5127 0.5316 0.5426 0.5026 0.5030 0.4915
Source: Ipea, IBGE and STN.
Table 3.4: Average of Gini Index
Variable < .10 .10− .25 .25− .50 .50− .75 .75− .90 > .90
Per Capita Income 0.5863 0.5706 0.5642 0.5372 0.5369 0.5530
Current Expenditure/GDP 0.5479 0.5529 0.5518 0.5570 0.5625 0.5611
State Tax Transfers to Municipalities/GDP 0.5763 0.5643 0.5608 0.5514 0.5413 0.5387
Governmental Transfers 0.5770 0.5461 0.5423 0.5549 0.5638 0.5692
Literacy Rate 0.5851 0.5764 0.5683 0.5462 0.5347 0.5158
Infant Mortality 0.5090 0.5278 0.5468 0.5726 0.5852 0.5773
Share of Urban Population 0.5587 0.5604 0.5650 0.5526 0.5458 0.5420
People with Electrical Service (%) 0.5953 0.5885 0.5670 0.5453 0.5228 0.5108
People with Water Service (%) 0.5895 0.5849 0.5732 0.5427 0.5259 0.5085
Population Density 0.5987 0.5637 0.5504 0.5473 0.5486 0.5427
School Attendance 0.5912 0.5781 0.5652 0.5477 0.5337 0.5126
Current Revenue/GDP 0.5484 0.5530 0.5499 0.5603 0.5597 0.5612
People with Waste Service (%) 0.5811 0.5836 0.5664 0.5475 0.5323 0.5143
Life Expectancy 0.5740 0.5878 0.5699 0.5464 0.5314 0.5103
HDI 0.5793 0.5799 0.5695 0.5396 0.5369 0.5257
Source: Ipea, IBGE and STN.
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Table 3.5: BMA - Posterior Coefficient Estimates - Theil - First Scenario
Variable PIP Post Mean Post SD Cond.Pos.Sign Post Mean/SD
Per Capita Income (R$ 1,000.00) 1.0000 0.7598 0.2454 1.0000 3.0958
Per Capita Income Squared 1.0000 -3.2211 0.5469 0.0000 -5.8902
Per Capita Income Cubic 1.0000 2.8080 0.4183 1.0000 6.7134
Governmental Transfers 1.0000 0.0025 0.0004 1.0000 6.8313
Literacy Rate 1.0000 -0.0136 0.0007 0.0000 -19.5772
People with Electrical Service (%) 1.0000 -0.0015 0.0002 0.0000 -8.3529
School Attendance 1.0000 -0.0069 0.0006 0.0000 -12.0029
Life Expectancy 1.0000 -0.0289 0.0017 0.0000 -16.6892
HDI 1.0000 4.3704 0.2598 1.0000 16.8219
People with Waste Service (%) 1.0000 -0.0006 0.0001 0.0000 -5.9479
People with Water Service (%) 1.0000 -0.0010 0.0002 0.0000 -5.6875
Share of Urban Population 1.0000 -0.0465 0.0082 0.0000 -5.6663
Current Revenue/GDP 0.9986 -0.1175 0.0298 0.0000 -3.9485
Population Density 0.9327 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 -2.5791
Infant Mortality 0.8687 0.0009 0.0005 1.0000 2.0225
North/Northeast Region 0.8319 -0.0173 0.0096 0.0000 -1.8127
Current Expenditure/GDP 0.0695 0.0060 0.0264 0.9816 0.2273
State Tax Transfers to Municipalities/GDP 0.0162 -0.0007 0.0137 0.0000 -0.0515
Table 3.6: BMA - Top Models - Theil - First Scenario
B1 B2 B3 B4 B5 B6 B7 B8
Per Capita Income (R$ 1,000.00) 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Per Capita Income Squared 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Per Capita Income Cubic 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Current Expenditure/GDP 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1
State Tax Transfers to Municipalities/GDP 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
Governmental Transfers 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Literacy Rate 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Infant Mortality 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 1
Share of Urban Population 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
People with Electrical Service (%) 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
People with Water Service (%) 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Population Density 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1
North/Northeast Region 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 0
School Attendance 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Current Revenue/GDP 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
People with Waste Service (%) 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Life Expectancy 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
HDI 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
PMP 0.6590 0.0837 0.0574 0.0542 0.0517 0.0414 0.0105 0.0102
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Table 3.7: BMA - Posterior Coefficient Estimates - Gini - First Scenario
Variable PIP Post Mean Post SD Cond.Pos.Sign Post Mean/SD
Per Capita Income (R$ 1,000.00) 1.0000 -0.1981 0.1197 0.0000 -1.6549
Per Capita Income Squared 1.0000 -0.1235 0.2699 0.0021 -0.4576
Per Capita Income Cubic 1.0000 0.2875 0.2077 1.0000 1.3847
Literacy Rate 1.0000 -0.0059 0.0003 0.0000 -17.9705
People with Electrical Service (%) 1.0000 -0.0009 0.0001 0.0000 -9.8101
People with Water Service (%) 1.0000 -0.0007 0.0001 0.0000 -8.8809
School Attendance 1.0000 -0.0043 0.0003 0.0000 -15.0573
Life Expectancy 1.0000 -0.0127 0.0009 0.0000 -14.5673
HDI 1.0000 1.9278 0.1232 1.0000 15.6463
North/Northeast Region 0.9996 -0.0152 0.0031 0.0000 -4.9343
Governmental Transfers 0.9979 0.0008 0.0002 1.0000 4.4251
Current Revenue/GDP 0.9975 -0.0653 0.0116 0.0000 -5.6489
Population Density 0.9500 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 -2.8172
Infant Mortality 0.8531 0.0005 0.0002 1.0000 1.9239
People with Waste Service (%) 0.1491 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 -0.3764
State Tax Transfers to Municipalities/GDP 0.0461 0.0035 0.0190 1.0000 0.1832
Current Expenditure/GDP 0.0228 0.0003 0.0056 0.8905 0.0504
Share of Urban Population 0.0157 0.0000 0.0005 0.9546 0.0442
Table 3.8: BMA - Top Models - Gini - First Scenario
B1 B2 B3 B4 B5 B6 B7 B8
Per Capita Income (R$ 1,000.00) 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Per Capita Income Squared 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Per Capita Income Cubic 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Current Expenditure/GDP 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
State Tax Transfers to Municipalities/GDP 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0
Governmental Transfers 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Literacy Rate 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Infant Mortality 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 1
Share of Urban Population 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
People with Electrical Service (%) 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
People with Water Service (%) 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Population Density 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1
North/Northeast Region 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
School Attendance 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Current Revenue/GDP 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
People with Waste Service (%) 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0
Life Expectancy 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
HDI 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
PMP 0.6340 0.1071 0.1047 0.0338 0.0307 0.0238 0.0131 0.0102
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Table 3.9: BMA - Posterior Coefficient Estimates - Theil - Second Scenario
Variable PIP Post Mean Post SD Cond.Pos.Sign Post Mean/SD
Per Capita Income Cubic 1.0000 2.4292 0.6466 1.0000 3.7569
Governmental Transfers 1.0000 0.0024 0.0004 1.0000 6.3289
Literacy Rate 1.0000 -0.0140 0.0008 0.0000 -16.9403
People with Electrical Service (%) 1.0000 -0.0015 0.0002 0.0000 -8.2340
School Attendance 1.0000 -0.0072 0.0006 0.0000 -11.0422
Life Expectancy 1.0000 -0.0298 0.0021 0.0000 -14.3301
HDI 1.0000 4.5537 0.3515 1.0000 12.9552
Per Capita Income Squared 1.0000 -2.6804 0.8911 0.0000 -3.0081
People with Waste Service (%) 1.0000 -0.0006 0.0001 0.0000 -5.8599
Share of Urban Population 1.0000 -0.0467 0.0082 0.0000 -5.7147
People with Water Service (%) 1.0000 -0.0010 0.0002 0.0000 -5.5782
Current Revenue/GDP 0.9988 -0.1193 0.0292 0.0000 -4.0862
Population Density 0.9467 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 -2.7647
Infant Mortality 0.8877 0.0010 0.0005 1.0000 2.1566
North/Northeast Region 0.8846 -0.0198 0.0093 0.0000 -2.1255
Per Capita Income (R$ 1,000.00) 0.6672 0.5069 0.4103 1.0000 1.2354
Current Expenditure/GDP 0.0657 0.0056 0.0254 0.9831 0.2200
State Tax Transfers to Municipalities/GDP 0.0162 -0.0007 0.0135 0.0000 -0.0491
Table 3.10: BMA - Top Models - Theil - Second Scenario
B1 B2 B3 B4 B5 B6 B7 B8
Per Capita Income (R$ 1,000.00) 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 0
Per Capita Income Squared 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Per Capita Income Cubic 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Current Expenditure/GDP 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
State Tax Transfers to Municipalities/GDP 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Governmental Transfers 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Literacy Rate 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Infant Mortality 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 0
Share of Urban Population 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
People with Electrical Service (%) 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
People with Water Service (%) 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Population Density 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1
North/Northeast Region 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 1
School Attendance 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Current Revenue/GDP 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
People with Waste Service (%) 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Life Expectancy 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
HDI 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
PMP 0.4401 0.2768 0.0559 0.0383 0.0362 0.0345 0.0277 0.0207
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Table 3.11: BMA - Posterior Coefficient Estimates - Gini - Second Scenario
Variable PIP Post Mean Post SD Cond.Pos.Sign Post Mean/SD
Literacy Rate 1.0000 -0.0059 0.0003 0.0000 -17.6691
People with Electrical Service (%) 1.0000 -0.0009 0.0001 0.0000 -9.7684
People with Water Service (%) 1.0000 -0.0007 0.0001 0.0000 -8.8415
School Attendance 1.0000 -0.0044 0.0003 0.0000 -15.0228
Life Expectancy 1.0000 -0.0128 0.0009 0.0000 -14.4672
HDI 1.0000 1.9353 0.1272 1.0000 15.2091
North/Northeast Region 0.9997 -0.0153 0.0031 0.0000 -4.9575
Governmental Transfers 0.9977 0.0008 0.0002 1.0000 4.3721
Current Revenue/GDP 0.9976 -0.0654 0.0116 0.0000 -5.6453
Population Density 0.9485 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 -2.7959
Per Capita Income (R$ 1,000.00) 0.8413 -0.2296 0.1166 0.0000 -1.9700
Infant Mortality 0.8398 0.0004 0.0002 1.0000 1.8499
Per Capita Income Cubic 0.7320 0.2059 0.1948 1.0000 1.0569
Per Capita Income Squared 0.4095 -0.0306 0.2523 0.5899 -0.1214
People with Waste Service (%) 0.1437 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 -0.3678
State Tax Transfers to Municipalities/GDP 0.0482 0.0037 0.0195 1.0000 0.1881
Current Expenditure/GDP 0.0227 0.0003 0.0056 0.8931 0.0522
Share of Urban Population 0.0160 0.0000 0.0005 0.9627 0.0422
Table 3.12: BMA - Top Models - Gini - Second Scenario
B1 B2 B3 B4 B5 B6 B7 B8
Per Capita Income (R$ 1,000.00) 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 0
Per Capita Income Squared 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 1
Per Capita Income Cubic 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 1
Current Expenditure/GDP 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
State Tax Transfers to Municipalities/GDP 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Governmental Transfers 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Literacy Rate 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Infant Mortality 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 1
Share of Urban Population 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
People with Electrical Service (%) 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
People with Water Service (%) 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Population Density 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
North/Northeast Region 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
School Attendance 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Current Revenue/GDP 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
People with Waste Service (%) 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 1
Life Expectancy 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
HDI 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
PMP 0.3624 0.1524 0.0939 0.0643 0.0553 0.0318 0.0207 0.0191
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Table 3.13: Theil L Index - AIC and BIC
First Scenario Second Scenario
Basic Complete AIC BIC AIC BIC
Intercept 0.538*** 1.297*** 1.294*** 1.299*** 1.294*** 1.299***
(0.007) (0.085) (0.085) (0.085) (0.085) (0.085)
Per Capita Income (R$ 1,000.00) -0.181* 0.732*** 0.728*** 0.723*** 0.728*** 0.723***
(0.093) (0.237) (0.237) (0.237) (0.237) (0.237)
Per Capita Income Squared 0.263 -3.169*** -3.153*** -3.160*** -3.153*** -3.160***
(0.338) (0.534) (0.533) (0.533) (0.533) (0.533)
Per Capita Income Cubic 0.332 2.774*** 2.762*** 2.773*** 2.762*** 2.773***
(0.327) (0.411) (0.411) (0.411) (0.411) (0.411)
Current Expenditure/GDP 0.088* 0.085* 0.085*
(0.050) (0.050) (0.050)
State Tax Transfers to Municipalities/GDP -0.056
(0.097)
Governmental Transfers 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Literacy Rate -0.014*** -0.014*** -0.014*** -0.014*** -0.014***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Infant Mortality 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Share of Urban Population -0.046*** -0.046*** -0.046*** -0.046*** -0.046***
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
People with Electrical Service (%) -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
People with Water Service (%) -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Population Density 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
North/Northeast Region -0.020*** -0.020*** -0.021*** -0.020*** -0.021***
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
School Attendance -0.007*** -0.007*** -0.007*** -0.007*** -0.007***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Current Revenue/GDP -0.178*** -0.184*** -0.114*** -0.184*** -0.114***
(0.047) (0.046) (0.020) (0.046) (0.020)
People with Waste Service (%) -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Life Expectancy -0.029*** -0.029*** -0.029*** -0.029*** -0.029***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
HDI 4.411*** 4.404*** 4.419*** 4.404*** 4.419***
(0.247) (0.247) (0.247) (0.247) (0.247)
R2 0.009 0.250 0.250 0.250 0.250 0.250
Adj. R2 0.009 0.247 0.247 0.247 0.247 0.247
Num. obs. 5507 4616 4616 4616 4616 4616
***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1
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Table 3.14: Gini Index - AIC and BIC
First Scenario Second Scenario
Basic Complete AIC BIC AIC BIC
Intercept 0.623*** 1.070*** 1.072*** 1.071*** 1.075*** 1.074***
(0.003) (0.043) (0.043) (0.043) (0.042) (0.042)
Per Capita Income (R$ 1,000.00) -0.667*** -0.190 -0.193 -0.202* -0.250*** -0.253***
(0.048) (0.120) (0.119) (0.119) (0.036) (0.036)
Per Capita Income Squared 1.589*** -0.139 -0.135 -0.121
(0.173) (0.270) (0.269) (0.268)
Per Capita Income Cubic -0.949*** 0.298 0.296 0.288 0.195*** 0.198***
(0.168) (0.208) (0.208) (0.207) (0.051) (0.051)
Current Expenditure/GDP 0.018
(0.025)
State Tax Transfers to Municipalities/GDP 0.082* 0.085* 0.086*
(0.049) (0.049) (0.049)
Governmental Transfers 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Literacy Rate -0.006*** -0.006*** -0.006*** -0.006*** -0.006***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Infant Mortality 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Share of Urban Population 0.001
(0.004)
People with Electrical Service (%) -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
People with Water Service (%) -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Population Density 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
North/Northeast Region -0.015*** -0.015*** -0.016*** -0.015*** -0.016***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
School Attendance -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.004***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Current Revenue/GDP -0.091*** -0.077*** -0.064*** -0.078*** -0.065***
(0.024) (0.012) (0.010) (0.012) (0.010)
People with Waste Service (%) 0.000** 0.000** 0.000**
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Life Expectancy -0.012*** -0.013*** -0.013*** -0.013*** -0.013***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
HDI 1.936*** 1.947*** 1.935*** 1.978*** 1.963***
(0.125) (0.122) (0.121) (0.105) (0.104)
R2 0.091 0.319 0.319 0.318 0.319 0.318
Adj. R2 0.091 0.317 0.317 0.316 0.317 0.316
Num. obs. 5507 4616 4616 4617 4616 4617
***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1
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3.7 Figures
(a) Theil L Index (b) Gini Index
(c) Per Capita Income
Figure 3.1: Kernel Densities Estimates.
112
Figure 3.2: Scatter Plot - Theil L Index x Per Capita Income.
113
Figure 3.3: Scatter Plot - Gini Index x Per Capita Income.
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(d) Second Scenario: Gini index
Figure 3.4: Posterior Model Size Distribution.
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(a) (b)
(c) (d)
Figure 3.5: Relationship between Income Inequality and Economic Growth - Nonparametric
Estimation (Simple Model) and its Gradient - Dependent Variable: Theil L index.
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(a) (b)
(c) (d)
Figure 3.6: Relationship between Income Inequality and Economic Growth - Nonparametric
Estimation (Simple Model) and its Gradient - Dependent Variable: Gini index.
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(a) (b)
(c) (d)
Figure 3.7: Relationship between Income Inequality and Economic Growth - Nonparametric
Estimation (Principal Components) and its Gradient - Dependent Variable: Theil L index.
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(a) (b)
(c) (d)
Figure 3.8: Relationship between Income Inequality and Economic Growth - Nonparametric
Estimation (Principal Components) and its Gradient - Dependent Variable: Gini index.
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